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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a summary judgment of the Second
Judicial District. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A.,
1953, § 78-2-2 (3) (j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Does U.C.A., 1953, § 63-30-3 create absolute immunity for

the construction of flood control improvements?
2.

Assuming § 63-30-3 creates absolute immunity, does it

violate article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution?
3.

Is article I, § 22 of the Utah State Constitution self-

executing?
4.

Does U.C.A., 1953, § 63-30-10.5 apply retroactively to a

claim based on article 1, § 22 of the Utah State Constitution?
5.

Where construction of a public improvement causes damage

to private property, can a plaintiff allege alternative claims in
inverse condemnation and negligence?
6.

Where

construction

of

a

lawfully

authorized

public

improvement causes damage to private property, can a plaintiff
recover in inverse condemnation for non-intentional damages?
7.

Where

construction

of

a

lawfully

authorized

public

improvement permanently impairs the value of private property, and
such impairment is a foreseeable consequence of the construction,
has there been a taking under the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution?
8.

Where the state and a private party enter into an easement

contract, and the easement right is abused, is the state liable for
breach of contract?

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Const, article I, § 11:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of law, which shall be administered without
denial or unnecessary delay . . • .
Utah Const, article I, § 22:

"Private property shall not be

taken or damaged for public use without just compensation."
Utah Const, article I, § 24: "All laws of a general nature
shall have a uniform operation."
U.C.A., 1953, § 63-30-3:
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all
governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury which
results from the exercise of a governmental function . . . .
The management of flood waters and other natural disasters
and the construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm
systems by governmental entities are considered to be
governmental functions, and governmental entities and their
officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or
damage resulting from those activities.
U.C.A., 1953, § 63-30-10.5:
1. Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for the recovery of compensation from the governmental
entity when the governmental entity has taken or damaged
private property without just compensation.
2. Compensation and damages shall be assessed according
to the requirements of Chapter 34, Title 78.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Course of Proceedings

The plaintiff, Farmers New World
("Farmers"), sued Bountiful City

Life

Insurance

Company

("Bountiful") and others for

damages to a commercial mall owned by Farmers.

One of Farmers'

claims against Bountiful was in inverse condemnation under article
2

I, § 22 of the Utah Constitution.

Bountiful moved for summary

judgment on all claims, and the trial court granted the motion (the
"first ruling").
Farmers amended its complaint and added inverse condemnation
claims against Bountiful under the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.

Bountiful moved to dismiss the new claims,

and the trial court again granted the motion (the "second ruling").
Farmers appeals both the first and second rulings.
B.

Relevant Facts

Farmers is the owner of a commercial building located in
Bountiful known as Fifth South Plaza ("the mall").

Bordering the

south wall of the mall is a natural waterway known as "Mill Creek."
(Record 4,6 (hereinafter "R."); Addendum 4,6 (hereinafter "Add.".))
In 1985 Bountiful built a concrete channel
culvert") in Mill Creek adjacent to the mall.

lining

("the

Construction of the

culvert was authorized, approved, and funded in part by Davis
County pursuant to its flood control authority.
Add. 26-27, 30.)

(R. 230-31, 244;

Bountiful obtained from Farmers a deed granting

a right of way and easement that allowed Bountiful to construct and
maintain the culvert.

(R. 374-79.)

Prior to construction, the south wall of the mall received
important lateral support from Mill Creek's north embankment.
Because the culvert construction involved the possible excavation
of the embankment, it posed the risk of removing the lateral
support unless special precautions were taken, such as shoring or
bracing the south wall. The construction also posed the risk that
3

Mill Creek might be diverted against the south wall of the mall.
Bountiful was aware of or should have been aware of these risks.
(R. 7, 8, 16, 17; Add. 7, 8, 16, 17.)

Bountiful chose defendant

McNeil Construction Company ("McNeil") to build the culvert. The
contract gave Bountifulfs engineer the right to inspect McNeil's
work and order that special precautions, such as shoring and
bracing, be taken. (R. 7-8, 13, 231; Add. 7-8, 13, 27.)
McNeil's construction of the culvert caused physical damage to
the mall by McNeil's excavation of the north embankment of Mill
Creek without shoring or bracing the mall's south wall.

The

resulting loss of lateral support extensively damaged the mall.
In addition, McNeil diverted Mill Creek against the mall's south
wall.

The water seeped through spaces in the wall panels and

damaged the mall and its sewer system. The damage rendered certain
portions of the mall uninhabitable.

(R. 8-10, 22; Add. 8-10, 22.)

Farmers filed this lawsuit against Bountiful and McNeil for
the damages caused by the construction of the culvert.

Farmers

included as co-defendants the architect, contractor, and developers
who originally designed, constructed, and developed the mall.
3; Add. 3.)
that U.C.A.,

(R.

Bountiful moved for summary judgment on the ground
1953, § 63-30-3 provides absolute

construction of a flood control system.

immunity

for

(R. 217-93, 294-302.)

Farmers opposed the motion, asserting (1) that § 63-3 0-3 does not
provide absolute immunity; (2) that, regardless of § 63-30-3,
Farmers had a right of action based on inverse condemnation; and
(3) that the easement created an implied contract that estopped
4

Bountiful from denying liability.

(R. 354-79.)

In its first

ruling, the trial court held that:
1.

Section 63-30-3 provides absolute immunity for any damages

resulting from the construction of a flood control system;
2.

Farmers has no right of action under article I, § 22 of

the Utah Constitution because the provision is not self-executing;
3.

Even if article I, § 22 were self-executing, it does not

extend to actions arising out of negligently tortious conduct and
therefore Farmers had not stated a claim under that section;
4.

Section 63-30-10.5, which waives governmental immunity for

claims based on the taking or damaging of private property for
public use without just compensation, does not apply to this case
because it was enacted after the case was filed and is not
retroactive; and
5.

No basis existed for an implied contract claim.

(R. 394-

97; Add. 54-57; see also minute entry at R. 380, Add. 53.)
Thereafter, Farmers amended its complaint to add inverse
condemnation claims based on the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.

(R. 348-427; Add. 58-87.)

On a motion to

dismiss by Bountiful, the trial court dismissed these claims on the
ground that Farmers had not alleged a "taking" within the scope of
the Fifth Amendment.

(R. 657-60; Add. 88-91.)

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court erroneously interpreted § 63-30-3 as creating
absolute immunity. The plain language of the statute creates only
qualified immunity.

If the statute were interpreted to create

absolute immunity, then it would violate the equal protection
clause of the Utah Constitution.
Regardless of this statutory immunity, Farmers is entitled to
sue Bountiful for inverse condemnation under article I, § 22 of the
Utah Constitution. The holding of Fairclough v. Salt Lake County,
354 P.2d 105 (Utah I960), should be overruled because article I,
§ 22 is self-executing and therefore constitutes a waiver of
sovereign immunity.

Fairclough's reasoning is unsupported; it is

against the great weight of modern authority; and it violates the
fundamental purpose and policy of article I, § 22. Farmers is also
entitled

to

sue under

§ 63-30-10.5.

This

section

applies

retroactively because it simply provides a procedure for enforcing
a pre-existing constitutional right.
The trial court erred because inverse condemnation can be
asserted in cases arising out of negligent or tortious conduct.
The trial court misunderstood the elements of inverse condemnation,
which are wholly independent of the elements of negligence. Intent
to cause damage is not an element of inverse condemnation.

The

better-reasoned cases hold that, regardless of intent, a plaintiff
is entitled to compensation for physical injury substantially
caused

by

a

deliberately

designed

6

and

constructed

public

improvement.

Farmers properly alleged such elements of inverse

condemnation.
Bountiful's construction of the culvert also resulted in an
uncompensated taking under the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

The Fifth Amendment protects against the unfair,

uncompensated taking of private property.

A physical taking is

unnecessary; the uncompensated destruction or impairment of the
property's usefulness also results in an improper taking.

The

determination of whether a taking has occurred hinges on the facts
alleged here.

The facts alleged in Farmer's amended complaint

clearly indicate that a cause of action exists.
Finally, the trial court erred when it found, as a matter of
law, that no

implied

contract

existed

between

Farmer's and

Bountiful. The city's contractual obligations remain an unresolved
factual issue which precludes summary judgment. Bountiful clearly
entered into a contractual relationship with Farmers; the effect
of the agreement cannot be properly determined within the limits
of summary judgment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

Standard of Review

As discussed above, Farmers is appealing from (1) the trial
court's first ruling, which granted Bountiful's motion for summary
judgment and (2) the trial court's second ruling, which granted
Bountiful's motion to dismiss.
This Court's review of the two rulings is based on similar
though slightly differing standards of review.
7

(1) In reviewing

an appeal from a summary judgment, this Court views the facts and
reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion.

E.g., Atlas v. Clovis National Bank,

737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987).

(2) In reviewing an appeal from a

motion to dismiss, this Court will not dismiss if there is any
state of facts provable under the allegations of the complaint to
support plaintifffs claim.

E.g., Corporation of the President v.

Wallace. 573 P.2d 1285, 1288 (Utah 1978).
POINT II:

Section 63-30-3 Should Be Interpreted As Creating Only
Qualified Immunity for Flood Control Construction

The trial court ruled that U.C.A., 1953, § 63-30-3 provides
absolute immunity to governmental entities for damages resulting
from a flood system, and thus Bountiful was immune from suit in
this case.

Farmers challenges this ruling.

Section 63-30-3 begins with a statement of qualified immunity.
"Except

as may

be otherwise

provided

in this

chapter, all

governmental entities are immune from suit from any injury which
results
Paragraph

from

the

2 of

exercise

§ 63-30-3

of

a

governmental

defines

flood

function...."

control activities,

including construction of flood control systems, as a governmental
function, and then states:

"[Governmental entities and their

officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or
damage resulting from those activities."
Farmers submits that the trial court's interpretation ignores
the plain language of the statute.

Paragraph 2 of § 63-30-3 does

not use the phrase "absolute immunity" anywhere.
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Nothing in this

paragraph overrides the qualified immunity stated at the beginning
of the section.

The final clause in paragraph two extends the

qualified immunity to not just governmental entities, but also to
"their officers and employees," which the first paragraph does not
do.
Furthermore, the interpretation adopted by the trial judge
leads to unconstitutional results, and should therefore be avoided.
E.g. , State v. Lindcruist, 674 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1983); State v. Wood,
648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982).

This interpretation violates the equal

protection clause of the Utah Constitution, article I, § 24, which
states,

"All

laws

of

a

general

nature

shall

have

uniform

operation."
The first step in applying article I, § 24 is to determine the
appropriate standard of review for evaluating the lawfulness of the
discriminatory classification.

The strictness of the standard

depends on the right or interest discriminated against. Malan v.
Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 674 n. 17 (Utah 1984).

The right involved in

this case is the right to a full remedy for an injury to property,
which is an important right guaranteed by the open courts clause
of the Utah Constitution, article I, section 11.

See Condemarin

v. University Hospital, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (1989) ; Berry ex rel.
Berrv

v.

Beech

Aircraft

Corp.,

717

P.2d

670

(Utah

1985).

Accordingly, the standard of review appropriate in this case should
have more bite than mere minimum scrutiny. Classifications should
be reasonable, and the statute that creates the classification here

9

must in fact reasonably and substantially further the legislative
purpose.

Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d at 672, 673.

The trial judge's interpretation of § 63-30-3, creates two
classes of litigants:

(1) those injured through flood control

measures, and (2) those injured through other acts by governmental
entities performing governmental functions.

The first class is

denied the right to sue in any case, whereas the second class may
sue when they fit within one of the waiver provisions of § 63-305 through 63-30-10.5.

The critical issue is whether absolutely

denying the first class the right to sue while allowing the second
class to fall within the exceptions to immunity will strengthen
flood control efforts.
In the context of immediately imminent flooding constituting
an emergency, the classification might make sense.

In such a

situation, the specter of liability might cause a governmental
entity to hesitate to act, and such hesitation could be very costly
in loss of lives or damage to property.
In the context of long-term

flood control improvements,

however, which is what this case involves, there is no imminent
danger, "no emergency requiring split-second action."

Smith v.

City of Los Angeles, 153 P.2d 69, 78 (Cal. 1944).

A municipality

has

flood

the

time

improvements.

to

properly

plan

and

construct

control

There is no reason that under such circumstances,

a municipality subjected to the qualified immunity of § 63-3 0-3
would hesitate to construct flood control facilities anymore than
it would hesitate to construct a road, a sewer, a drainage culvert
10

or any other necessary public improvement for which it also has
only a qualified immunity• The statute discriminates unreasonably
without advancing the legislative purpose of the statute.

It is,

therefore, unconstitutional•
For the foregoing reasons, § 63-30-34 should create qualified
immunity, or should be held unconstitutional in violation of
article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution,
POINT III:

Article I, Section 22 Is Self-Executing
and Constitutes Consent by the State to Be Sued

Regardless of the immunity in § 63-30-3, Farmers is entitled
to sue Bountiful in inverse condemnation under article I, § 22.
That provision is self-executing.

Because it is self-executing,

the state waives its sovereign immunity, including any immunity
under §63-30-3.
A.

Introduction.

The eminent domain power of the State of Utah and its
subdivisions

is

limited

by

article

I,

§

22

of

the

Utah

Constitution, which provides:
Private property shall not be taken or damaged
without just compensation.
Where a private individual brings an action for compensation
under a provision like article I, § 22, such an action is often
referred to as an "inverse condemnation" claim.

It is so named

because it is the inverse or reverse of the typical situation,
where the state brings a condemnation action.

See United States

v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257, 100 S. Ct. 1127, 1130 (1980).
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The trial court's first ruling asserted that the plaintiff
could not bring an inverse condemnation action under article I, §
22 because this provision is not "self-executing," i.e., it does
not by itself create a cause of action but requires enabling
legislation.

See Black's Law Dictionary 1220 (5th ed. 1979)•

In

so holding, the trial court followed Fairclouah v. Salt Lake
County, 354 P.2d 105 (Utah 1960) and its progeny, which hold that
article I, § 22 is not self-executing.
Farmers urges this Court to carefully review the Fairclouah
decision.

If it does so, it will see that the holding in

Fairclouah is unsupported; that the great weight of authority is
against Fairclouah and that Fairclouah violates the fundamental
purpose and policy

underlying article I,

§ 22.

Therefore,

Fairclouah should be overruled.
B.

The Fairclouah Decision.

In Fairclouah. the plaintiffs sued Salt Lake County and the
Utah Road Commission under article I, § 22 for damages to their
land resulting from a 16 foot reduction of the grade of a street
abutting their land. The defendants moved to dismiss on the basis
of sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motion, and the
Utah Supreme Court reversed.
Writing for the Court, Justice Henriod set forth the relevant
law as follows:
[Consistently and historically we have ruled that
the State may not be sued without its consent;
taken the view that article I, § 22 of our
Constitution is not self-executing, nor does it
give consent to be sued, implied or otherwise; and
that to secure such a principle is a legislative
12

matter, a principle recognized by the legislature
itself. [354 P.2d at 106 (footnotes omitted).]
It should be noted that the foregoing sentence states four
separate propositions of law:
1.

The state may not be sued without its consent;

2.

Article I, § 22 is not self-executing;

3.

Article I, § 22 does not constitute consent by the state

to be sued; and
4.

Consent by the state to be sued is solely a legislative

matter, and is never found in the Constitution.
It should also be noted that the second, third, and fourth
propositions do not logically follow from the first. Although the
state may not be sued without its consent, the question remains
whether article I, § 22 is self-executing and therefore constitutes
such consent.
Two justices concurred in the reasoning of the decision, and
one concurred only in the result. The fifth justice, Justice Wade,
filed a strong dissent.

Justice Wade criticized the prevailing

opinion as being unjust, contrary to article I, § 22, contrary to
previous Utah decisions, unsupported, and contrary to the weight
of authority and better-reasoned cases. His dissent in Fairelough
refers to his dissent in a prior case, Springville Banking Co. v.
Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100, 349 P.2d 157,

159-167 (1960), which

analyzes in depth the same issues raised in Fairclough.

See also

Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117, 1122-24 (Utah 1975) (Bullock,
District Judge, dissenting).
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C.

Reasons why Fairclouah should be overruled.

This court should overrule Fairclouah, and therefore reverse
the trial court, for the following reasons:
1.

The holding of Fairclouah is unsupported.

Fairclouah begins with the general proposition that the state
may not be sued without its consent. Farmers does not dispute this
proposition. The question remains whether article I, § 22 is selfexecuting and therefore gives such consent.
Fairclouah

answers

this

question

negatively

by

stating,

" [consistently and historically we have ... taken the view that
article I, § 22 of our Constitution is not self-executing, nor does
it give consent to be sued, implied or otherwise ... ."

This

statement is inaccurate, since prior to Fairclouah there was at
least one Utah case holding that a right of action exists under
article I, § 22. In Kimball v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 253, 90 P.
395, 397 (1907), the court stated:
Counsel, we think, overlook the purpose of the
constitutional provision [article I, § 22,] which was
expressly adopted to afford a relief not then existing to
all whose property might thereafter be damaged. . . . It
is manifest . . . that respondents are entitled to recover
in this case under both the constitutional provision as
well as under the statute aforesaid.
See also State v. District Court, 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502, 508509 (1938); Croft v. Millard County Drainage District, 202 P.2d 539
(Utah 1921); Webber v. Salt Lake City, 40 Utah 221, 120 P. 503
(1911).
Furthermore, the opinion does not cite a single Utah case that
directly supports its statement that article I, § 22 is not self14

executing.

(Farmers is unaware of any such Utah cases.)

In most

of the Utah cases cited by Fa ire lough, the case either did not
involve real property or, if it did, the decision did not directly
address the self-executing nature of article I, § 22.

See Jopes

v. Salt Lake County, 9 Utah 2d 297, 343 P.2d 728 (1959) (injury to
person); Bingham v. Board of Education. 118 Utah 582, 223 P.2d 432
(1950) (same); State v. Tedesco. 4 Utah 2d 31, 286 P.2d 785 (1955)
(self-executing nature of article I, § 22 not directly addressed);
Hiorth v. Whittenburg, 121 Utah 324, 241 P.2d 907 (1952) (same);
Campbell Building Co. v. State Road Commission, 95 Utah 242, 70
P.2d 857 (1937) (same); Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 134 P. 626
(1913) (same).
Only two Utah cases cited by Fairclough directly address
article I, § 22 in the opinion.

In the first case, Springville

Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100, 349 P.2d 157 (1960), the
plaintiff claimed damages under article I, § 22, but conceded on
appeal that the state could not be sued for lack of consent. The
plaintiffs attempted to avoid the sovereign immunity problem by
suing the road commissioners directly.

Thus, the self-executing

nature of article I, § 22 was not at issue.
The second case, State v. District Court, 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d
502 (1938), contains the following dictum, ignored in Fairclough,
which is directly contrary to Fairclough1s holding:
We think it clear that the framers of the Constitution
did not intend to give the rights granted by [article I,]
§ 22, and then leave the citizen powerless to enforce such
rights.
. . . .

15

We think if a
method of enforcing
against the State,
State has given its
P.2d at 508-509-]
Fairclough

also

case arises where there is no other
a constitutional right except by suit
then it must be considered that the
consent to be sued in such a case. [78

cites

a

number

of

cases

from

other

jurisdictions. One of those cases, United States v. Lee. 106 U.S.
196 (1882) , is contrary to Fairclough in that it indicates that the
"just compensation" clause of the Fifth Amendment is enforceable
by the courts and therefore self-executing.

"Undoubtedly [this]

provision of the Constitution [is] of the character which it is
intended the courts shall enforce, when cases involving their
operation and effect are brought before them."

106 U.S. at 218.

A clearer statement of this rule was recently made in First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 107 S.Ct. 2378
(1987), which expressly holds the "just compensation" clause of the
Fifth Amendment to be self-executing.

107 S. Ct. at 2386.

In summary, then, Fairclough1s holding fails to cite contrary
Utah authority and is substantially lacking in support from the
cases it does cite.
2.

Fairclough is contrary to the great weight of modern
authority*

The great weight of modern authority is contrary to Fairclough.
At least 21 states currently have constitutional provisions,
similar to Utah's, providing that private property may not be taken
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or damaged for public use without just compensation.

Of these

states, at least 15 have held their constitutional provisions to
be self-executing.

Pima County v. Bilby, 87 Ariz. 366, 351 P. 2d

647 (1960); Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942);
Board of County Commissioners v. Adler, 69 Colo. 290, 194 P. 621
(1920); Adams v. City of Atlanta, 253 Ga. 581, 322 S.E.2d 730
(1984); People v. City of Mt. Vernon, 404 111. 58, 88 N.E.2d 45
(1949); Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069, 34 So. 2d 321 (1948); Page
v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District, 377 S.W.2d 348 (Mo.
1964); Austin v. Hennepin County, 130 Minn. 359, 153 N.W. 738
(1915) ; Wright v. Jackson Municipal Airport Authority, 300 So. 2d
805 (Miss. 1974); Alexander v. State, 142 Mont. 93, 381 P.2d 780
(1963); Parriott v. Drainage District, 226 Neb. 123, 410 N.W.2d 97
(1987) ; Derby Heights, Inc. v. Gantt Water and Sewer District, 237
S.C. 144, 116 S.E.2d 13 (1960); Hurley v. State, 82 S.D. 156, 143
N.W.2d 722 (1966) (self-executing in absence of adequate remedy);
Burns v. Board of Supervisors, 218 Va. 625, 238 S.E.2d 823 (1977);
Wyoming State Highway Dept. v. Napolitano, 578 P.2d 1342, 1346-47
(1978).

See also cases cited at Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117,

Alaska Const. , art. I, § 18; Ariz. Const., art. II, § 17;
Calif. Const., art. I, § 19; Colo. Const., art. II, § 15; Ga.
Const., art. I, § 3, f 1; 111. Const., art. I, § 15; La. Const.,
art. I, § 4; Mo. Const., art. I, § 26; Minn. Const., art. I, § 13;
Miss. Const., art. Ill, § 17; Mont. Const., art. II, § 29; Neb.
Const., art. I, § 21; N.M. Const., art. II, § 20; N.D. Const., art.
I, § 16; Okla. Const., art. II, § 23; S.C. Const., art. I, § 17;
S.D. Const., art. IV, § 13; Tex. Const., art. I, § 17; Va. Const.,
art. I, § 11; W.Va. Const., art. Ill, § 9; Wyo. Const., art. I, §
33; see also Nichols on Eminent Domain, vol. 2 § 6.01[3] n. 42;
vol. 7A § 14.03[1] n. 104 (rev'd 3rd eds. 1985 & 1988); see
generally 2A Nichols on Eminent Domain § 6.26 (rev'd 3rd ed. 1987).
17

1123 n. 6 (Utah 1975) (Bullock, District Judge, dissenting); 3
Nichols on Eminent Domain §§ 8.1[2] n. 15.01 & 8.1[4] nn. 24.2,
24.341 (rev'd 3rd ed. 1985); 27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain § 482
n. 5 (1966).
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has held the "just
compensation" clause of the Fifth Amendment to be self-executing.
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 107 S.
Ct. 2378, 2386 (1987).
Nichols has summarized the state of the law as follows:
The "damage clause" is generally held to be selfexecuting; that is, if the legislature authorizes the
construction of a public work which may injuriously affect
neighboring property and fails to provide a special
procedure for ascertaining and recovering damages, ... the
owner of the injured property is allowed to recover his
damages in an ordinary civil action.
[2A Nichols on
Eminent Domain, § 6.27[4] (rev'd 3rd ed. 1987).]
If the constitutional provision is self-executing, it follows
that the state has waived its sovereign immunity and consented to
suit.

E.g., Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942);

Board of County Commissioners v. Adler, 69 Colo. 290, 194 P. 621
(1920); Srb v. Board of County Commissioners, 601 P.2d 1082 (Colo.
App. 1979) ; Donovan v. Delaware Water and Air Resources Commission,
358 A.2d 717 (Del. 1976); Hoekstra v. County of Kankakee, 48 111.
App. 3d 1059, 365 N.E.2d 553 (1977); Bernard v. State, 127 So. 2d
774 (La. App. 1961); Alexander v. State, 142 Mont. 93, 381 P.2d 780
(1963); Tomasek v. State, 196 Or. 120, 248 P.2d 703 (1952); Makela
v. State, 205 A.2d 813 (Ver. 1964); Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417,
334 N.W.2d 67 (1983); see also Springville Banking Co. v. Burton,
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10

Utah

2d

100, 349

P.2d

157, 159-167

(1960)

(Wade,

J.,

dissenting); Nichols on Eminent Domain, vol, 3, § 8.1[4] & vol. 6A,
§ 30.1 n.12 (rev'd 3rd ed. 1985).
Such

a constitutional waiver

of

immunity

supercedes the

statutory attempts via § 63-30-3 to create immunity.

A case

directly on point is Short v. Pierce County, 78 P.2d 610 (Wash.
1938), in which the state of Washington passed a law immunizing
counties from liability for flood control actions. The plaintiffs1
property was damaged by the county's emergency actions in the face
of an impending flood, and by its actions taken to construct flood
control improvements after the flood danger had passed.
plaintiffs sued in inverse condemnation.

The

As to the second class

of damages (those incurred after the flood danger had passed), the
court ruled that the counties "had no right to use appellants1
property and to damage [it] ... without compensation" despite the
flood control immunity statute.

Id. at 616.

This Court should follow the weight of modern authority and
hold article I, § 22 to be a self-executing waiver of sovereign
immunity.
3.

The rule in Fairclough is contrary to the fundamental

purpose and policy underlying article I, § 22.
The Fairclough decision shows an understandable concern with
preserving sovereign immunity. Unfortunately, it chooses to do so
at the expense of citizen's rights under article I, § 22.
The purpose of article I, § 22 was to create a right which did
not exist at common law.

Oklahoma City v. Collins-Dietz-Morris
19

Co. , 79 P. 2d 791, 794 (Okla. 1938); see Kimball v. Salt Lake
County, 90 P. 395, 397 (1907).

If solely dependent on enabling

legislation, such a right is hollow and meaningless because the
legislature can vitiate the right by simply refusing or failing to
enact a remedy. See State v. District Court, 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d
502, 508 (1938).
The need for article I, § 22 to be self-executing is heightened
by the words, "or damaged."

Prior to the addition of this term to

state constitutions, compensation was allowed only for actual
physical takings of property. Cook v. Salt Lake City, 157 P. 643,
645 (1916).
early

With the rapid growth of public improvements in the

1800fs,

injuries

frequently

occurred

that

were

non-

compensable, or damnum absque injuria, under the old rule.
Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 6.22 (rev'd 3rd ed. 1985).

2

Beginning

with Illinois in 1870, the states began to add the words "or
damaged" to their constitutions to allow compensation for damages
arising out of the construction of public improvements.

Twenty-

Second Corporation v. Oregon Short Line Ry. Co., 103 P. 243, 246
(1909); Kimball v. Salt Lake County, 90 P. 395, 396-97 (1907); 2A
Nichols on Eminent Domain § 6.26 (rev'd 3rd ed. 1987).
It is often difficult if not impossible to determine such
damage in condemnation proceedings held prior to construction of
the improvement.
521,

See Cities Service Gas Co. v. Huebner, 200 Okl.

197 P.2d 985

appropriately
improvement

(1948).

remedied

by

Accordingly, such damage is more
allowing

private

suits

after

the

is completed when the damages can be definitely
20

determined.

See Rose v. State, 123 P.2d 505, 513 (Cal. 1942).

The rule in Fairclouah prevents suits for damages occurring after
the fact, and in essence reverts to the old rule of damnum absque
injuria.
Furthermore, a major policy underlying article I, § 22 is to
distribute

the

burdens

for

injuries

arising

out

of

public

improvements among the entire public, so that such burden is not
borne by a single individual.

Kimball v. Salt Lake County, 90 P.

395, 397 (1907); see also United States v. Willow River Power Co.,
324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945).

Such a distribution of burdens is fair,

equitable and just, and conforms with the notions of a civilized
society and with the modern view that individual property rights
should not be sacrificed to the interests of the State. As Justice
Traynor succinctly stated:
The construction of the public improvement is a deliberate
action of the state or its agency in furtherance of public
purposes. If private property is damaged thereby the state
or the agency must compensate the owner therefore, whether
the damage was intentional or the result of negligence on
the part of the governmental agency.
The decisive
consideration is whether the owner of the damaged property
if uncompensated would contribute more than his proper
share to the public undertaking.
[Clement v. State
Reclamation Board, 220 P.2d 897, 905 (Cal. 1950) (citations
omitted, emphasis added).]
Fairclough violates this policy by forcing individuals to bear the
entire burden for damages caused by a public improvement.
4.

Conclusion.

This Court has previously observed that private property rights
should not be made subservient to the sovereign power of the state.
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In Croft v. Millard County Drainage District, 202 P. 539, 541 (Utah
1921), this Court stated:
Even the state itself, when acting within the scope of its
sovereign powers, cannot take or damage private property
for public use without just and adequate compensation to
the person to whom the property belongs.

[Article I, § 22] is a fundamental law of the
commonwealth, binding upon every department of the state
government. It is the duty of the courts to give it full
force and effect whenever it is properly invoked by one
claiming its protection, even against the sovereign power
of the state.
This Court should give "full force and effect" to article I,
§ 22 by declaring it to be a self-executing waiver of the state's
sovereign immunity. Unless this is done, the right to recover just
compensation for damage to private property for a public use is of
no value.
POINT IV:

Section 63-30-10.5 Applies Retroactively

Even if this Court were to rule that article I, § 22 is not
self-executing, Farmers would be entitled to sue under U.C.A.,
1953, § 63-30-10.5, which provides:
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived for the recovery of compensation from the
governmental entity when the governmental entity has taken
or damaged private property without just compensation.
(2)
Compensation and damages shall be assessed
according to the requirements of Chapter 34, Title 78.
This provision reflects the legislature's decision to allow
inverse condemnation under article I, § 22 by expressly waiving
immunity

for

such

suits

and

by

providing

a

determining compensation and damages in such suits.
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procedure

for

The trial court ruled that Farmers could not sue under § 6330-10.5 because this lawsuit predates the enactment of the statute
and the statute is not retroactive*
This ruling is erroneous.

(R. 395-96; Add. 55-56.)

Even if article I, § 22 were not

self-executing, this provision nevertheless creates a substantive
constitutional right to just compensation.

See Oklahoma City v.

Collins-Dietz-Morris Co.. 79 P.2d 791f 794 (Okla. 1938).

This

right to just compensation has existed continuously, but lacks a
procedural method to remedy any violation.

"Statutes which are

procedural only and do not create, alter or destroy substantive
rights may be applied to causes of action that have accrued or are
pending at the time the statute is enacted."
State Industrial Commission, 725 P.2d

Carlucci v. Utah

1335, 1337

Pilcher v. State, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983).

(Utah 1986);

The language of § 63-

30-10.5 clearly provides the necessary procedure for enforcing that
right.

Therefore, according to established legal principles § 63-

30-10.5 should be applied retroactively.
Furthermore, amendments to the Governmental Immunity Act should
be applied retroactively where the legislature manifestly intended
such application.
(applying

Frank v. State, 613

P. 2d

517

amendment to § 63-30-3 retroactively) .

(Utah

1980)

In this case,

§ 63-30-10.5 was passed not long after the amendment to § 63-30-3
creating

immunity

legislative

for

intent of

flood

control

§ 63-30-10.5

actions.

The

manifest

is to allow persons whose

property was unconstitutionally taken or damaged by flood control
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measures to sue for just compensation.

Accordingly, this section

should be applied retroactively,
POINT V:

Plaintiff Has Sufficiently Alleged a Claim for Inverse
Condemnation under Article I, Section 22

As an alternative ground for its first ruling, the trial court
held that even if article I, § 22 were self-executing, plaintiff
had not adequately stated a claim thereunder because article I, §
22 does not apply to non-intentional, negligent conduct. The trial
court stated:
Even if § 22 were self-executing, inverse condemnation
actions thereunder would be limited to situations arising
out of the taking or damaging of tangible private property
for public use, intentionally made by public officers, and
would not extend to actions arising out of negligently
tortious conduct. [R. 395; Add. 55.]
Thus, the trial court ruled that

(1) inverse

condemnation

cannot be based on negligent or tortious conduct, and (2) intent
to take or damage is an essential element of inverse condemnation.
In so ruling, the trial court accepted Bountiful1s arguments that
inverse condemnation does not apply to or damages arising from
negligent acts or unintended damages

(citing Lund v. Salt Lake

County, 200 P. 510 (Utah 1921)) and that if unintentional damages
were

allowed

then

inverse

governmental immunity.

condemnation

would

"swallow

up"

(R. 490-91, 494; Add. 46-47, 50.)

The trial court's ruling is in error for the following reasons:
(A) Farmers1 inverse condemnation claim is not based on negligence;
(B)

Farmers

is

entitled

to

plead

inverse

condemnation

and

negligence as alternative claims; (C) intent to cause damages is
not

an

element

of

inverse

condemnation;
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and

(D)

allowing

compensation

for

unintentional

damages

does

not

destroy

governmental immunity•
A.

Farmers' Inverse
Negligence

Condemnation

Claim

Is

Not

Based

on

The trial court ruled that Farmers1 inverse condemnation claim
could not be based on negligent conduct.
a

misunderstanding

of

the

legal

This ruling demonstrates

theories

underlying

inverse

condemnation and negligence and also of the allegations of Farmer's
inverse condemnation claim.
Inverse condemnation and negligence are wholly
claims

based

on

entirely

different

legal

independent

theories.

Inverse

condemnation is not based on negligence or tort concepts.
v. Adams, 105 P.2d 416, 419
Mechanical, 464 P.2d

432

State

(Okla. 1940); Biorvatn v. Pacific

(Wash. 1970); see also 6A Nichols on

Eminent Domain § 28.3 at 28-86 to 28-87 (rev'd 3rd ed. 1985).

It

is based on a constitutional provision that has "created a right
which did not exist at common law."

Oklahoma City v. Collins-

Dietz-Morris Co., 79 P.2d 791, 794 (Okla. 1938).

Its elements are:

(1) a taking or damaging (2) of private property (3) for public use
(4) without just compensation.
On the other hand, the elements of negligence are (1) a duty
of reasonable care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2)
defendant's breach of that duty; (3) the breach's causation of
injury;

and

(4)

the

suffering

of

damages

by

Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985).
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the

plaintiff.

Thus,

the

better-reasoned

cases

hold

that

where

the

construction of a lawfully authorized public improvement causes
damage to private property, the owner is entitled

to

recover

regardless of whether the work was done negligently or properly.
E.g. ,
6

Reardon v. City and County of San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492,

P. 317, 325 (1885); Board of Commissioners v. Adler, 194 P. 621

(Colo. 1920); City of Newport v. Rosing, 319 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1959);
Thompson

v.

City

of

Philadelphia,

177

So.
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(Miss.

1937) ;

Jamestown Plumbing & Heating Co. v. City of Jamestown, 154 N.W.2d
355

(N.D. 1968); Biorvatn v. Pacific Mechanical, 464 P.2d

432

(Wash. 1970).
For example, in Biorvatn v. Pacific Mechanical, 464 P.2d 432
(Wash. 1970), the plaintiffs sued in inverse condemnation for the
sinking of their foundation and consequent damage caused by the
city's construction of a sewer adjacent to the house.

The court

held that sewer construction had resulted in removal of lateral and
subjacent support, and that such removal was a damaging of property
for a public use without just compensation.

Regarding the issue

of the city's possible negligence, the court stated:
Even though plaintiffs here might have proved that the
[city] and the contractor were negligent [in construction
of the sewer], their entitlement to recovery did not depend
upon such proof. Plaintiffs' right to recover here rested
not on concepts of negligence but on proving that [the
city], as condemnor, in exercising the power of eminent
domain for construction of a sewer in adjoining property,
inflicted a physical injury, directly and proximately
causing damage to the plaintiffs' real property and
improvements. [4 64 P.2d at 434.]
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Similarly, in State v. Adams, 105 P.2d 416, 419 (Okla. 1940),
the court stated:
For the second ground for reversal, defendant urges
that the State is not liable for the negligence of its
officers and agents in the construction and operation of
its highways . . • • But we think this assertion is based
upon a misconception of the cause of action alleged by
plaintiffs. • . . The action is predicated upon a right
given by the Constitution. . . . The negligence of the
officers and agents of the State is not the basis of
plaintiffs' claim.
The constitutional mandate that
"private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation" is not restricted to nonnegligent injuries. It imposes a liability when private
property is damaged for public use, negligence or no
negligence.
As in the foregoing cases, Farmers' right to recover in inverse
condemnation rests not on concepts of negligence, but rather on
alleging the elements of inverse condemnation, which Farmers has
done.

Farmers' inverse condemnation claim alleges that the

foreseeable and direct consequence of the culvert construction
contract was the removal of soil and diversion of the creek; that
Farmers

could

not prevent

such

acts

(presumably

because of

Bountiful's eminent domain power); that the removal of soil and
diversion of the creek physically injured Farmers1 property; and
that such injury constitutes a taking or damage of private property
for public use without just compensation.

(R. 17; Add. 17.)

Accordingly, there was no basis for the trial court to dismiss
Farmers1 inverse condemnation cause of action because it is based
on negligence.
B.

Farmers Can Plead Inverse Condemnation and Negligence as
Alternative Claims
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In ruling that Farmers1 inverse condemnation claim cannot be
based on negligent conduct, the trial court may have been referring
to the fact that in addition to Farmers1 inverse condemnation claim
against Bountiful, Farmers also claimed that Bountiful is liable
for the negligence of McNeil.

(R. 13-14; Add. 13-14.)

Such an

alternative claim, however, in no way precludes Farmers from
asserting a claim for inverse condemnation.
Although inverse condemnation is a wholly independent claim
from negligence, sometimes a plaintiff may be able to allege both
as alternative remedies. Lanning v. State Highway Commission, 515
P.2d 1355 (Or. App. 1973).

Thus it has been held that the mere

fact that the governmental entity committed a tort does not relieve
it from liability in inverse condemnation.

In State v. Leeson, 84

Ariz. 44, 323 P.2d 692, 696 (1958), the court stated:
It is next urged [by the state] that the flooding of
the appellee's premises was, if anything, no more than a
tort for which the State of Arizona is not liable. We do
not think this contention can be sustained.
The
constitution has reference to the interest invaded and not
to the particular conduct leading to the invasion. Conduct
which would be tortious if perpetrated by one individual
on another may be compensable as a taking and damaging when
perpetrated by the state upon an individual.
Accord Board of Commissioners v. Adler, 194 P. 621 (Colo. 1920);
Kinnischtzke v. City of Glen Ullin, 79 N.D. 495, 57 N.W.2d 588
(1953); State v. Adams, 105 P.2d 416, 419 (Okla. 1940); Morrison
v. Clackamas County, 18 P.2d 814 (Ore. 1933).
Accordingly, there was also no basis for dismissing Farmers1
inverse condemnation claim merely because Farmers1 also pleaded
negligence as an alternative cause of action.
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C

Intent to Cause Damages Is Not an Element of Inverse
Condemnation

The trial court also ruled that Farmers failed to state a claim
because inverse condemnation is limited to intentionally caused
damages. This ruling is erroneous and sets an unreachable standard
for proving that property has been "damaged" within the scope of
the constitutional provision.
In

states

whose

constitutions

contain

an

"or

damaged"

provision, the better-reasoned cases do not require intentional
damage.

Where

property

is physically

injured

by

a public

improvement as deliberately designed and constructed, the owner is
entitled to compensation even though the damage is unintentional:
The construction of the public improvement is a deliberate
action of the state or its agency in furtherance of public
purposes. If private property is damaged thereby the state
or the agency must compensate the owner therefore, whether
the damage was intentional or the result of negligence on
the part of the governmental agency.
Clement v. State Reclamation Board, 220 P.2d 897, 905 (Cal. 1950)
(citations omitted); see also State v. Williams, 120 P.2d 496, 501
(Wash.

1941)

(immaterial whether

damaging was

"voluntary or

involuntary").
A large number of cases supporting this view do not expressly
state that intent need not be proved. Rather, they state that the
plaintiff may recover whether the public improvement that caused
the damage was constructed negligently or properly. E.g., Massetti
v. Madrera Canal Co. . 68 P.2d 260 (Cal. App. 1937); Thompson v.
City of Philadelphia. 177 So. 39 (Miss. 1937) ; Andrews v. Proctor,
165 P.2d 610 (Okla. 1945).

By implication, however, if the damage
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was negligently caused it was not intentional•

See Clement v.

State Reclamation Board, supra.
The cases following the view that intent is not required apply
two different rules. The first, or "foreseeability rule," requires
that the damage must be the foreseeable and probable consequence
of intentional acts.
proximately

"It is enough to show the damages were

caused by the undertaking

of the project and a

reasonable foreseeable consequence of the undertaking." Rauser v.
Toston Irrigation District, 565 P.2d 632f 637 (Mont. 1977).

This

is the same rule applied by the federal courts for proving a taking
under the Fifth Amendment. E.g., R.J. Widen Co. v. United States,
357 F.2d 988 (Ct. CI. 1966); California v. United States, 151 F.
Supp. 570 (1957); Clark v. United States. 8 CI. Ct. 649 (1985); see
29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 110 at 449 & n. 40.5 (1965). Farmers'
inverse condemnation claim satisfies the requirements of this rule
by alleging such foreseeability in paragraph 86 of its complaint
2
and in the sixth cause of action of its "First Amended Complaint."
The second, or "no foreseeability rule," does not even require
that the damages be foreseeable. The most careful statement of the
Paragraph 86 of Farmers1s complaint states:
86. The foreseeable and probable consequence and direct
result of Bountiful City's contract with McNeil
Construction was the removal of soil from Farmer's property
adjacent to the Mall and the diversion of water from Mill
Creek next to the Mall. [R. 17; Add. 17.]
These allegations were further clarified in the sixth cause of
action of Farmers's "First Amended Complaint," which alleges that
Bountiful City foresaw that damage might result from the
construction but proceeded anyway. (R. 415-17; Add. 75-77.)
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"no foreseeability" rule is found in the leading case of Albers v.
County of Los Angeles. 42 Cal.Rptr. 89, 398 P.2d 129 (Cal. 1965).
In Albers. the California Supreme Court upheld the right to sue in
inverse condemnation for physical injuries caused by a landslide
resulting from the construction of a highway.

The court first

thoroughly analyzed its prior cases as well as statements from
Nichols on Eminent Domain, and then formulated the following rule:
[With two exceptions], any actual physical injury
to real property proximately caused by the
improvement
as
deliberately
designed
and
constructed is compensable under article I, section
14, of our Constitution whether foreseeable or not.
[398 P.2d at 137.]3
Subsequent

California

cases

have

refined

this

rule

by

interpreting the words "proximately caused"—which imply a tort
concept involving foreseeability, and therefore are undesirable—
to mean a substantial cause-and-effeet relationship which excludes
the probability that other forces alone produced the injury.
Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control District, 47 Ca. 3d 550,
253 Ca.Rptr. 693, 764 P.2d 1070, 1074-75 (Cal. 1988); see Holtz v.
Superior Court, 3 Cal.3d 296, 90 Cal. Rptr. 345, 475 P.2d 441
(1970).
The California "no foreseeability" rule does not create openended, absolute liability for inverse condemnation; rather, it

The two exceptions include the state's common-law right to
inflict damage and the state's right to inflict damage when such
infliction of damage is within the proper exercise of police power.
Neither of those exceptions apply in this case. The court also set
forth five factors to be considered in making this determination.
398 P.2d at 137.
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gives effect to the constitutional provision in a way that achieves
its policy of distributing losses caused by public improvements.
Belair, supra, 764 P.2d at 1074; Holtz, supra.
The theoretical basis for the "no foreseeability" rule is that
the right created by the "or damaged" clause is not restricted to
injuries that would be actionable at common law, but extends to any
physical

disturbance

of

a

private

property

construction of a public improvement.

right

caused

by

Albers v. County of Los

Angeles, supra, 398 P.2d at 134-35; see also Reardon v. City and
County of San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 6 P. 317, 325 (1885); 6A
Nichols on Eminent Domain § 6.30
instances

of

physical

(rev'd 3rd ed. 1987).

disturbances

for which

Common

compensation

is

allowed, regardless of foreseeability, include removal of lateral
support and water seepage.
F. 439 (C.C.

See Johnson v. City of St. Louis, 137

Mo. 1905) (removal of lateral support) ; Ketcham v.

Modesto Irrigation District. 135 Cal. App. 180, 26 P.2d 876 (1933)
(water seepage) ; Tormey v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation District,
200 P. 814

(Cal. App. 3rd 1921)

(water seepage) ; Biorvatn v.

Pacific Mechanical Construction, Inc., 464 P.2d 432 (Wash. 1970)
(removal of lateral support); State v. Williams, 120 P. 2d 496
(Wash. 1941) (removal of lateral support).
In this regard, this Court has stated in Board of Education v.
Croft, 373 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1962):
Damages to land, by the construction of a public or
industrial improvement, . . . [are] limited to injuries
that would be actionable at common law, or where there has
been some physical disturbance of a right, either public
or private, which the owner enjoys in connection with his
property and which gives it additional value, and which
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causes him to sustain a special damage with respect to his
property in excess of that sustained by the public
generally. It requires a definite physical injury . . .
such as .
destroying lateral supports. [Emphasis
added.]
Even where the damages result from a temporary condition in the
construction, as in the instant case, compensation for unforeseen
damages has been allowed under inverse condemnation.

In Oklahoma

City v. Collins-Dietz-Morris Co., 79 P.2d 791 (Okla. 1938), a
temporary condition in construction resulted in the flooding of the
plaintiff's basement.

The court upheld a judgment

for the

plaintiff, stating:
If the injured party has been consequentially damaged
by the construction of a public improvement, whether it was
done carefully and with skill or not, he is entitled to
compensation for such damage under the ["or damaged"
provision of the state constitution].

[W]e see no valid reason for holding a municipalityfs
liability in this situation is contingent upon whether the
public improvement causing the damage is completed or in
a temporary condition in the process of construction when
the damage occurred.
. . . [Consequential damages
resulting from a temporary condition in the construction
of a public improvement may be recovered under article 2,
§ 24 of the constitution. [79 P.2d at 795.]
The "foreseeability" and "no foreseeability" rules are much
more consistent with the purpose of the "or damaged" provision of
article I, § 22, than would be a rule of requiring intentional
damages. This provision was added to state constitutions to extend
the scope of the constitutional protection to damages arising from
the construction of public improvements, and was intended to remedy
the effects of the old damnum absque injuria rule that denied
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compensation unless an actual physical taking occurred. Albers v.
County of Los Angeles, supra; see also cases cited in part III.C.3,
supra.

Since the construction

of public

improvements often

results in damages that are not intended at the time of the
construction, then limiting "or damages" to mean only intentional
damages defeats the original purpose for the rule and revives the
old rule of damnum absque injuria.

It also defeats the policy

underlying the rule, to spread the burden caused

by public

improvements among all citizens.
Farmers urges this Court to adopt a "no foreseeability" rule
that allows recovery for physical damages substantially caused by
the deliberate construction and design of a public improvement.
Farmers urges the alternative adoption of a "foreseeability" rule.
Under either rule Farmers is entitled to have this case remanded
for further proceedings.
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

In its reply memorandum before the trial court, Bountiful cited
four cases in which compensation for unintentional
damages was denied.

(negligent)

(R. 492; Add. 48.) One of these cases, Harris

v. United States. 205 F.2d 765, 767-68

(10th Cir. 1953), is

distinguishable because it only decides the question of whether the
injury sustained was a "taking" (not a "damaging") and because the
conduct causing the damage was a single ministerial act (the test
firing of guns).
Two of the cases relied on by Bountiful are distinguishable
because

they

do

not

involve

the
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construction

of

a

public

improvement, but rather the ministerial acts of county or city
employees: maintenance of public works or crop spraying. Havashi
v. Alameda County Flood Control District. 334 P.2d 1048 (67 Cal.
App. 2d 584, 334 P.2d 1048, 1053 (1959) (maintenance of public
work); Dallas v. County Flood Control District v. Benson. 157 Tex,
617, 306 S.W.2d 350 (1957) (spraying weeds).

These cases follow

the rule that mere ministerial acts do not constitute a "public
use" and thus are not within the scope of the constitutional
provision.

McNeil v. City of Montague, 124 C.A.2d 326, 268 P.2d

497 (1954); see Eriksen v. Anderson, 195 Va. 655, 79 S.E.2d 597
(1954).

In contrast, the construction of public works, which

involves the right to condemn land under the power of eminent
domain, does qualify as a public use.

Hayashi v. Alameda County

Flood Control District, (67 Cal. App. 2d 584, 334 P.2d 1048, 1053
(1959); McNeil v. City of Montague, 124 C.A.2d 326, 268 P.2d 497
(1954) .
Bountiful also cited Lund v. Salt Lake County, 200 P. 510 (Utah
1921) , for the proposition that the

"the damages

for which

compensation is allowed under article I, § 22, of the state
Constitution are such as are the direct consequences of the lawful
exercise of the right of eminent domain, and that ordinarily such
damages are unavoidable."

Id. at 514 (emphasis added).

In Lund the plaintiff was the owner of certain fish ponds. He
sued in inverse condemnation for the destruction of his fish caused
by the county's discharge of water from a reservoir, which water
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flowed over a manure field, into plaintiff's fish ponds, and killed
plaintiff's fish.
Significantly, the analysis in Lund begins with the proposition
that property must be taken or destroyed for a "public use," Lund
then proceeds to give as examples of damaging for public use cases
in which the damage resulted from the construction of a public
improvement,

E.g., Chicago v. Tavlor. 125 U.S. 161

(1888)

(construction of viaduct)•
Lund could have stopped there, and held that since the
governmental act (release of water from reservoir) was not the
construction of a public improvement but rather the ministerial act
of county employees, then there was no "public use" and therefore
article I, § 22 did not apply.

But Lund added an additional

requirement, i.e., that the damage be the unavoidable consequence
of the act.

Lund cites no authority for this view; rather, it

adopts counsel's interpretation of a prior Utah case (Morris v.
Oregon Shortline R. Co., 102 P. 629 (1909).
Lund does not apply to this case for the following reasons:
(1) Lund is distinguishable on its facts. It should be treated
as standing for the narrow proposition that damages resulting from
ministerial acts, such as maintenance of a public work, are not a
public use. In fact, this Court appears to have distinguished Lund
on that basis in Croft v. Millard County Drainage District, 202 P.
539, 541 (1921), in which the Court sustained an action against a
drainage district for damages caused by improperly constructed
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drainage facilities.

"The distinction [with Lund] readily appears

upon a casual reading of the opinion."

202 P. at 541.

(2) The standard set by Lund, that damages be "unavoidable,"
is too high.

Such a standard would preclude most suits that the

"or damaged" clause was intended to allow.

The cases previously

discussed show that it is sufficient to allege, as Farmers has
done,

that

the

damages

were

the

foreseeable

and

probable

consequence of the city's intentional acts.
(3) The statement in Lund that the damages must be unavoidable
is not in accord with modern authority and the better reasoned
cases discussed previously in this section, and thus this statement
should be overruled.
D.

Inverse Condemnation
Immunity.

Does

Not

Destroy

Governmental

One of Bountiful's arguments was that if inverse condemnation
is extended too far, it will "swallow up" governmental immunity.
When

the

considered,
argument.
1.

various
it

limitations

is difficult

to

of
see

inverse
any

condemnation

real

basis

for

are
this

These limitations include the following:

Inverse condemnation does not apply to personal injury,

only injury to property;
2.

The rule does not extend damages caused by momentary acts

of carelessness, but is limited to damages caused by the deliberate
design

and

construction

of public works; Bauer v.

Ventura, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 289 P.2d 1, 7 (1955);
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County

of

3.

As just discussed, it does not apply to damages caused by

mere ministerial acts, which are not "for public use";
4.

It does not apply to acts of the state made under necessity

or emergency, such as in the face of an immediately impending
flood.

See Short v. Pierce County. 78 P.2d 610 (Wash. 1938).

Furthermore, the purpose of article I, § 22 is to insure that
individuals will not be forced to bear a disproportionate burden
from the cost of public improvements.

If this policy is to be

enforced, then of a necessity sovereign immunity necessarily must
be waived in some cases.

As the California Supreme Court has

pointed out:
The tendency under our system is too often to sacrifice the
individual for the community; and it seems very difficult
in reason to show why the State should not pay for property
which it destroys or impairs the value, as well as for what
it physically takes. [Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 398
P.2d 129, 137 (Cal. 1965).]
POINT VI:

Farmers Sufficiently Alleged a Taking Under the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution

Farmers alleged in its amended complaint that Bountiful's acts
resulted in a taking which violated the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution (R. 417, Add. 77). In order to pursue
this cause of action, Farmers must show that it has correctly
pleaded an unconstitutional taking. Dismissal is inappropriate if
there is a "state of facts provable in support of [Farmers] claim.11
Wells v. Walker Bank & Trust, 590 P.2d 1261, 1263 (Utah 1979).
this case, the trial court's dismissal
complaint should be reversed.
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In

of Farmers's amended

The determination of whether a taking has occurred within the
Fifth Amendment depends on the unique facts of each case. United
States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958). The
United States Supreme Court has held that no "rigid rules" exist
that govern this determination, but that each case must be judged
on its own facts. United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc.. 344
U.S. 149, 156 (1952).

The Court has identified, however, two

important factors that must be considered in these essentially ad
hoc factual inquiries.

Penn Central Transportation Co. , v. New

York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).

These are (1) the economic

impact of the government's action, and (2) the character of the
government's action.

Id. In regard to the second factor, a

physical invasion by the government is more likely to be a taking
than a mere regulatory program.

Id. Recent United States Supreme

Court case law does not require a permanent "taking" to be shown;
a

temporary

regulatory

taking

is

sufficient

to

require

compensation. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County
of Los Angeles, 107 S.Ct. 2378 (1987).

Thus, even if the taking

here were only temporary/ it is still compensable.
Bountiful has severely affected Farmers's property rights, with
a corresponding negative economic impact on Farmers's investment.
Farmers has alleged significant permanent damage to the mall,
substantial

reduction

in

the

mall's

value,

and

substantial

impairment to the mall's usefulness by rendering it uninhabitable
to its business occupants.

In addition, Farmers has alleged the

actual invasion of its property rights resulting from Bountiful's
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removal of lateral support and its diversion of Mill Creek against
the mall's foundation.

Any doubts about Farmers' allegations and

inferences should be resolved in favor of allowing Farmers to
present proof of an unconstitutional taking. Wells v. Walker Bank
& Trust Co. , 590 P.2d at 1263.
allegations preclude dismissal.

When accepted as true, these
Id.

POINT VII: Bountiful City Damaged Farmers by Abusing its Easement
Rights; the Trial Court Ignored this Abuse and
Wrongfully Granted Bountiful City's Motion for Summary
Judgment
In response to Bountiful's Motion for Summary Judgement,
Farmers argued that the easement was a contract by which Farmers
had certain implied rights and Bountiful had certain implied
duties.

Farmers further argued that Bountiful had abused the

rights it had acquired under the easement.

Id.

In response to

Bountiful's claim of immunity, Farmers argued that Bountiful was
estopped from raising this argument because it had entered into a
contract with Farmers when it accepted the easement (R. 3 61-64).
Bountiful asserted in turn that the easement was not a contract and
that

it had

not

signed

the

easement

and

therefore

had

no

obligations under it (R. 483-84; Add. 39-40).
Based upon the pleadings, memoranda and arguments made before
it, the trial court ruled that "there [was] no basis for an implied
contract claim against Bountiful given the nature of dealings
between the parties and the remote relationship between Bountiful
and [Farmers]."

(R. 396; Add. 56). The trial court has failed to

properly assess the facts and analyze the law regarding easements.
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An

easement

is

an

interest

in

land,

an

incorporeal

hereditament, a liberty, privilege, right or advantage. See e.g.,
Kennedy v. Bond. 460 P.2d 809 (N. Mex. 1969); Perrin v. Derbyshire
Scenic Acres Water Corp., 388 P.2d 949 (Wash. 1964).

Contrary to

Bountiful!s

does

argument

to

trial

court, a

grantee

incur

contractual obligations by accepting a conveyance transferring the
property

interest;

the

grantee's

signature

is

unnecessary.

Bracklein v. Realty Ins. Co. 80 P.2d 471, 477 (Utah 1948).

By

accepting the Right-Of-Way For A Creek Easement (the "Easement"),
Bountiful acquired contractual rights and incurred contractual
obligations.

The rights include:

a. A perpetual right-of-way and easement for the purpose
of digging, laying concrete, connecting to and maintaining,
cleaning and operation [sic] a creek and drainage facility 21'
wide, being 10.5' on each side of the following described
center line;
b. The right of ingress and egress along said right-ofway ; and
c. The right to maintain, operate
drainage facility].

and

replace

[the

See Affidavit of Graham Ritchie (R. 374-79).
Bountiful also incurred contractual obligations.

First, the

Easement expressly reserves to Farmers the right "to fully use the
said premises except for the purpose which this right of way or
easement is granted to [Bountiful]." Id. This express reservation
is no different than the law in Utah:
[t]he rights of the dominant owner [Bountiful] are
limited by the rights of the servient owner
[Farmers]. Each owner must exercise his rights so
as not unreasonably to interfere with the other.
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Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co, v. Movie, 174 P.2d 148, 158 (Utah
1946) (citations omitted).

Bountiful must respect the rights

Farmers has to use its property and it has not.
Bountiful also incurred an implied obligation to protect
Farmersfs right of lateral support.

The right of lateral support

applies to any property interest or use.

See Salt Lake City v.

J.B. and R.E. Walker, Inc., 253 P.2d 365, 370 (Utah 1953) ; see also
Holm v. Davis, 125 P. 403, 407 (Utah 1912); Laden v. Atkeson, 116
P.2d 881, 884-84 (Mont. 1941).

Consequently, Farmers' existing

right to lateral support creates a corresponding obligation in
Bountiful to preserve that support.
In the present case, Bountiful exceeded its easement rights by
unreasonably removing soil providing essential and significant
lateral support to the mall.

Its actions actually destroyed the

easement and increased the burdens of the dominant tenement and
injured and damaged the servient tenement.

See Fletcher v.

Stapleton, 10 P.2d 1019, 1020, 123 Cal.App. 133 (1932).

Bountiful

breached its contract. Farmers has alleged sufficient information
constituting either breach of contract or trespass by Bountiful.
The conduct of Bountiful has increased the burdens on the dominant
tenement and damaged Farmers, the owner of the servient tenement.
Trespass occurred when Bountiful abused its easement rights and
breached its contract.

In Laden v. Atkeson, 116 P. 2d at 884-85,

the Montana Supreme Court said:
If the owner of an easement exceeds his rights
either in the manner or extent of its use, or if
he enters upon or uses the land of the servient
estate for any unauthorized purposes, he is guilty
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of a trespass and the servient owner may obtain
such action, although no actual damage has been
sustained by him.
Because

Bountiful

abused

this

easement

by

unnecessarily

removing significant lateral support to the mall, it has breached
its contractual obligations and trespassed.

Consequently, this

abuse increased the burdens of the dominant estate and damaged
Farmers.

Bountiful

avoids

governmental immunity issues.

these

issues

by

focussing

on

Governmental immunity does not

absolve a governmental entity in a contractual relationship.
Bountiful owes Farmers contractual obligations and must use its
property rights in a fair and reasonable manner regardless of its
governmental status. U.C.A., 1953, section 63-30-5. Farmers has
been denied the right to recover contractual damages resulting from
Bountiful's actions.

The trial court, therefore, abused its

discretion in dismissing Farmers1 complaint against Bountiful on
the allegations constituting breach of contract and trespass.
Because Farmers1 implied rights against Bountiful creates factual
questions, the judgment was improperly granted in this case and
should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Although the construction of public improvements, including
flood control, is a laudatory and beneficial endeavor, the state
should be required to pay the just cost of such improvements. Such
cost includes damages to individuals injured by the construction
of the improvement.

As Justice Holmes warned, "We are in danger

of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public
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condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a
shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change."
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, Farmers
requests the following relief:
1.

A ruling that § 63-30-3 creates only qualified immunity for

damages resulting from the construction of flood control systems,
or in the alternative, that § 63-30-3 violates article I, § 24 of
the Utah Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional.
2.

A ruling that Farmers' inverse condemnation claim under

article I, § 22 of the Utah Constitution be reinstated, with
instructions that Farmers is entitled to compensation under that
provision if Farmers proves that the culvert, as deliberately
designed and constructed, was a substantial cause of the damage to
the mall, regardless of foreseeability.
3.

A ruling that Farmers1 inverse condemnation claim under the

Fifth Amendment be reinstated, with instructions that Farmers be
entitled to compensation if it proves that the construction of the
culvert resulted in permanent impairment of the mall's value and
that such impairment was a natural and probable consequence of the
construction.
4.

A

ruling

that

Farmers1

breach

of

contract

claim be

reinstated.
5.

A remand of the case to the trial court consistent with the

foregoing rulings.
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DATED this IM^ day of May, 1989.

Jannes L. cnristensen
Paul D. Newton
Mark J. Morrise
PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAILING
The undersigned, attorney for plaintiff and appellant Farmers
New World Life Insurance Co., hereby certifies that on May 2kfe,
1989, he caused the foregoing "Brief of Appellant" to be served on
all parties to this appeal, by mailing copies thereof by firstclass mail, postage prepaid, on the following:
Attorneys for Bountiful City
Allan L. Larson
Stanley J. Preston
Robert C. Keller
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Dated:

Ai**y 3*,fffl

James L. Christensen
Paul D. Newton
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ADDENDUM
[This addendum is consecutively numbered, with page numbers
at the top center of each page. The record numbers appear in the
lower corner of the page.]
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James L. Christensen, USB No. A0639
Paul D. Newton, USB No. 4382
Mark J. Morrise, USB No. 3840
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
215 South State Street, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 534-0909
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
FARMERS NEW WORLD LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT

v.
C i v i l No. *4I3<JD
BOUNTIFUL CITY, MCNEIL
CONSTRUCTION, SHARP, SORENSEN
AND ASSOCIATES, INTERWEST
CONSTRUCTION, FASHION VILLAGE
SHOPPING CENTER, a partnership,
THE FASHION VILLAGE GROUP,
MERRILL W. BECK, WILLIAM
COMPTON, and JOHN DOES 1
through 5,

1&CC

pd

Defendants.
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Plaintiff complains of Defendants as follows:
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE
2

vnoo:*
1.

Farmers New World Life Insurance Company ("Farmers"),

is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
State of Washington.
2.

Bountiful City is a municipal corporation of the State

of Utah and is located in Davis County, State of Utah.
3.

McNeil Construction is a Utah corporation with its

principal place of business in Davis County, State of Utah,
4.

Interwest Construction is a Utah corporation with its

principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
5.

Sharp, Sorensen and Associates, fka Sharp/Pinegar &

Associates, is a Utah corporation with its principal place of
business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
6.

Fashion Village Shopping Center is a Utah limited

partnership registered with the Davis County Clerk, State of
Utah.
7.

The Fashion Village Group is a limited partnership

registered with the Davis County Clerk, State of Utah.
8.

Merrill W. Beck is an individual residing in Davis

County, State of Utah.
9.

William W. Compton is believed to be an individual

residing in Davis County, State of Utah.
10 • John Does 1 through 5 are unknown persons or entities
who Farmers shall join in this action once it learns of their
identities.
11.

The acts that are the subject of this dispute occurred

in Davis County, State of Utah.
3
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12.

Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Section 78-3-4 of

Utah Code Annotated.
13.

Venue is proper pursuant to Sections 78-13-1(1) and 78-

13-7 of the Utah Code Annotated.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
A. Construction of Building.
14.

On or about April 28, 1977, the architect, Sharp,

Sorensen & Associates, prepared the original plans and drawings
("Plans") for the construction of a commercial building upon real
property located at approximately 500 South 200 West, Bountiful,
Utah, which property was owned by Merrill W. Beck and William
Compton.
15.

Merrill W. Beck and William Compton (the "Developers")

employed

Interwest Construction to build a commercial building

pursuant to the Plans.
16.

Thereafter,

Interwest Construction built a commercial

building on the above real property now know as Fifth South Plaza
fka Fashion Square Village (hereinafter the real property and
building shall be collectively referred to as "the Mall").
17.

Several feet from and running parallel to the south

wall of the Mall is a waterway known as "Mill Creek."
18.

The Plans required Interwest Construction to do, among

other things, the following:
a.

Install and grout reinforced steel in certain

cells in the hollow, precast wall panels;
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b.

Install and grout "L"

shaped steel dowels into

these grouted cells and into the floor slab;
c.

Improve the Creek;

d.

Install an outside clean-out for the sewer line at

the southwest corner of the building.
19.

Upon information and belief and contrary to the Plans,

Interwest Construction:
a.

Did not install reinforced steel in all of the

required cells in the wall panels;
b.

Did not grout the reinforced steel in all of the

required wall panels;
c.

Did not tie dowels into the walls and the floor;

d.

Did not grout the dowels in the wall panels;

e.

Did not improve the channel of Mill Creek;

f.

Did not install an outside clean-out for the sewer

line at the southwest corner of the building;
g.

Did not perform other matters to be discovered

during the pendency of this litigation.
20.

Trees, vegetation, and foliage were growing between the

north bank of Mill Creek

and the south wall of the Mall

stabilized the soil between the Mall and Mill Creek.
B. Transfer of Ownership of Mall.
21.

From about July 11, 1977 through September 11, 1979,

Merrill W. Beck and William Compton conveyed the Mall to Fashion
Village Shopping Center, a limited partnership.

5
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22.

On

or

about

September

11,

1979,

Fashion

Village

Shopping Center, a limited partnership, conveyed the Mall to

The

Fashion Village Group,
23.

On

or

about

January

31, 1980, Farmer's

loaned

The

Fashion Village Group $1,450,000.00, secured by a Deed of Trust
on the Mall.
24.

On or

about

January

10, 1983, Larry

G.

Moore,

as

successor trustee under the above Deed of Trust, conveyed title
to the Mall to Farmers by way of a Trustee's Deed.
C. Construction of Culvert.
25 o

On or

about March

29, 1973, Grea

Dick

Corporation

conveyed to Bountiful City a perpetual right-of-way and easement
for any and all city, municipal, and utility purposes over a
portion of the Mall.
26.

On

or

about

October

16, 1975, Valley

Corporation

conveyed to Bountiful City a perpetual right-of-way and easement
for the use of utility

lines and creek maintenance

across a

portion of the Mall.
27.

On or about October 17, 1985, Farmers, at the request

of Bountiful City, executed a right-of-way agreement for a creek
easement, which agreement conveyed to Bountiful City "a perpetual
right-of-way

and

easement

for the purpose of digging,

laying

concrete, connecting to and maintaining, cleaning and operation
[sic] a creek drainage facility".
28.
Bountiful

Upon information and belief, prior to October 17, 1985,
City

had

acquired

a prescriptive
6

right-of-way

and
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easement over Mill Creek

for the purpose of maintaining,

operating, repairing, improving, and replacing the same.
29.

During the fall of 1985, Bountiful City advertised for

and took bids from various contractors for the construction of a
culvert and/or concrete channel lining ("Culvert") in Mill Creek.
The segment of Mill Creek's channel to be lined included the
entire segment adjacent to the south wall of the Mall.
30.

After receiving bids, Bountiful City awarded the

Culvert project to McNeil Construction.
31.

By the construction contract for the Culvert project,

Bountiful City required McNeil Construction to do, among other
things, the following:
a.

To shore up, brace, underpin, sheet, and protect

as may be necessary all foundations and other parts of all
existing structures adjacent and adjoining the side of the
project, which are in any way affected by the excavations or
other operations connected with the completion of the work
under the contract;
b.

To indemnify Bountiful City for any damages caused

from the loss of lateral support of adjoining property and
consequent damages to adjacent structures;
c.

To provide

immediate,

adequate

protective

construction, or to reinforce any shoring, bracing or
sheeting as required by the engineer of Bountiful City;
d.

To divert the Creek so as to avoid damage to

adjoining property;
7
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e.

To

avoid use of broken

concrete

asphalt,

used

reinforcing steel, and other rubble and debris as backfill;
f.

To scarify the fill area to a depth of six inches

compacted to a specified density and in a specified manner;
g.

To grade the site work area. by hand to specified

elevations,

slopes

and

contours

to

effectuate

proper

drainage;
h.

To use trench digging machines only if they will

not cause damage to structures above or below the ground.
32.
Culvert

Before

the commencement

project, the entire

of

the construction

south wall

of

the Mall

several feet below the surface of the adjacent soil.
which

formed

the

north

embankment

to

Mill

Creek,

of

the

extended

This soil,
provided

important subjacent lateral support to the exterior of the south
wall by offsetting interior lateral pressure from backfill inside
the wall.
33.

Contrary to the construction contract for the Culvert

project, McNeil Construction:
a.
Mall

Did not install bracing or shoring to support the

after excavating

and removing the soil between Mill

Creek and the south wall of the Mall;
b.

Diverted water from Mill Creek directly next to

and against the building;
c.

Included broken concrete, debris, rubble, etc. in

the backfill;

8
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Did not compact soil used as backfill to required

density and in specified manner;
e.

Did not grade the site work areas to specified

elevations, slopes, and contours;
f.

Used

trench digging machines which damaged the

Mall.
34.

The water which McNeil Construction diverted from Mill

Creek directly against the south wall of the Mall seeped through
spaces between

the wall's concrete panels

and

caused

"hydro

compacting" of the fill material inside the wall and underneath
the floor.
35.
Mall

Prior to the soil adjacent to the south wall of the

being

replaced,

Farmers

discovered

damage

to the Mall

structure caused by removal of lateral support to the south wall
and diversion of Mill Creek directly against the Mall's south
wall.

This damage included cracks in the south wall and adjacent

floor, tilting of wall panels, holes in the wall panels, and
undue

structural

stress

throughout

the

building,

which

may

continue to occur.
36.

Only

after

Farmers

had

made

several

demands

upon

Bountiful City did McNeil Construction place backfill between the
Culvert and the south wall of the Mall.
37.

The new backfill provided much

less lateral

support

than the original soil adjacent to the south wall because the
amount of new backfill was less than the original amount of soil,
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was

of

poor

grade,

and

was without

significant

density

or

compaction*
38.

Due to the acts or omissions of one or more of the

defendants, the fill under the floors in the Mall has recently
settled, leaving a void between the floor slab and the fill, thus
changing

the

slope

of

the

main

sewer

drain

and

individual unit pipes from the main drainage.

separating

Raw sewage and

water has flowed into the soil instead of the main drain, and use
of restroom facilities for certain tenants in the Mall has been
disrupted.
39.

Farmers has been damaged by the acts or failure to act

by one or more of the defendants, which damages include, but are
not limited to:
the Mall; and
walls,

(1) loss of income; (2) diminution in value of
(3) cost of repair to the Mall's roof, floors,

plumbing,

sewer,

and

fill;

and,

but

not

limited

to

reclamation of vegetation behind the south wall of the Mall.
40.

Farmers has given notice of most of the defects to all

the known Defendants; and not one has offered to remedy them.
41.

Farmers also has satisfied the notice requirements of

§§63-30-11 and 63-30-13 of Utah Code Annotated.
42.
submitted

Pursuant

to

Utah

Code

Ann.,

§63-30-14, the

claim

to Bountiful City is deemed denied because Bountiful

City or its insurance carrier has failed to approve or deny the
claim.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligence - McNeil Construction)
10
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43.

This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through

42 as though fully set forth herein.
44.

By virtue of the contract between Bountiful City and

McNeil Construction, McNeil Construction agreed to perform the
details of the contract, especially

in regard to the method,

means and manner of shoring and bracing adjacent foundations,
walls and structures.
45.

In performing

the

excavation

and

construction

work

adjacent to the Mall, McNeil Construction owed Farmers a duty of
reasonable care to not damage or injure the Mall.
46.

McNeil Construction failed to exercise reasonable care

in the manner in which it excavated the area adjacent to the Mall
by, among other things, removing almost all the soil adjacent to
the south wall, failing to shore up and brace the south wall,
diverting Mill Creek directly against the Mall's south wall, and
by inadequately replacing the soil adjacent to the south wall.
47.

McNeil Construction's negligence caused damage to the

Mall and to Farmers.
48.

McNeil Construction is liable in damages to Farmers for

its negligence.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Trespass - McNeil Construction)
49.

This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through

42 as though fully set forth herein.
50.
Bountiful

Pursuant

to

City

McNeil

and

the

construction
Construction,
11

contract
McNeil

between

Construction

V°Q12
trespassed

on Farmer's Mall by entering thereon, removing

Farmer's soil, failing to shore up and brace the south wall of
the Mall during construction, diverting water from Mill Creek
directly against the Mall's soth wall, and inadequately replacing
the original soil, and otherwise abusing, unreasonably exercising
and exceeding the rights available to it under the easements in
favor of Bountiful City,
51.

These trespasses caused damage to and seriously injured

Farmer's and its Mall.
52.

McNeil Construction is liable to Farmers for damages

caused by these trespasses.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Contract - McNeil Construction)
53.

This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through

42 as though fully set forth herein.
54.

The construction contract for the Culvert between

Bountiful

City

and

McNeil

Construction

required

McNeil

Construction to shore up, brace, underpin, sheet, and protect as
may be necessary all foundations and other parts of all existing
structures adjacent to and adjoining the site of the Culvert
construction project.
55.

This contract further required McNeil Construction to

provide, install, and maintain adequate sheeting and bracing to
support the sides of banks of excavation.
56.

Farmers is a third party beneficiary of the above-

described contract.
12
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57.

McNeil

Construction

breached

its

contract

with

Bountiful City and with Farmers as a third party beneficiary of
the

contract

shoring,

by

failing

bracing,

and

to provide
underpinning

necessary
as

and

required

adequate
for

the

foundation, walls, floors, and ceilings for Farmer's building.
58.

McNeil Construction is liable to Farmers for damages

caused by McNeil Construction's breach of the contract.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Liability for Agent's Acts - Bountiful City)
59.

This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through

42 as though fully set forth herein.
60.
McNeil

By virtue of the contract between Bountiful City and
Construction,

Bountiful

City

retained

the

right

and

authority to control the method, means and manner that McNeil
Construction

would

perform

the

details

of

the

contract,

especially in regard to the method, means and manner of shoring
and bracing adjacent foundations, walls and structures.
61.
Bountiful

During

the

construction

of

the

Culvert

Project,

City did in fact exercise control over the method,

means and manner that McNeil Construction performed the details
of the contract.
62.

By virtue of the control

retained

and exercised by

Bountiful City over McNeil Construction, Bountiful City is liable
for

the

negligence

and

trespasses of McNeil

Construction

in

performing the construction contract as more fully set forth in
the First and Second Causes of Action herein.
13
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63.

Bountiful

City

is liable

in damages to Farmers

for

McNeil Construction's acts of negligence and trespass.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Duty to Prevent Unlawful or Tortious Act - Bountiful City)
64.

This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through

42 as though fully set forth herein.
65.
was

The construction work performed by McNeil Construction

unlawful

negligently

and/or

removed

tortious
lateral

in

that

support

McNeil

from

the

Construction
Farmer's

Mall,

failed to provide bracing and shoring, diverted water from Mill
Creek directly next to the south wall of the Mall, and failed to
adequately replace the soil and its appurtenances.
66.

Bountiful

Construction's

City

unlawful

had

timely

and/or tortious

notice

of

McNeil

conduct, but took no

steps to prevent or remedy that conduct, made no objection to
acts and omissions of McNeil Construction, and did not notify
Farmers of such acts and omissions.
67.

Bountiful

City has inspected

and

accepted

the work

performed by McNeil Construction on the Culvert behind Farmers'
Mall.
68.
failure

Bountiful City is liable to Farmers in damages for its
to prevent, object

to, remedy, or notify

Farmers of

McNeil Construction's unlawful or tortious conduct.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligent Hiring of McNeil Construction - Bountiful City)
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69.

This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through

42 as though fully set forth herein.
70.

In selecting McNeil

Construction

as its contractor,

Bountiful City had a duty of due care to Farmers to select a
competent contractor.
71.

On information and belief, Farmers alleges that McNeil

Construction was inexperienced in the type of work required by
the contract and/or had a poor reputation as a contractor at the
time of its hiring and/or had submitted a bid that was inadequate
to competently and reasonably complete the work required by the
construction contract for the Culvert.
72.

Bountiful

reasonably
Construction

have
that

City

knew,

ascertained
McNeil

competent or experienced

should
at

the

Construction

have
time
was

known,
it
not

or

hired

could
McNeil

sufficiently

to perform the work required by the

contract or had submitted an inadequate bid.
73.

Bountiful City failed to select a competent contractor

to perform the work required by the contract.
74.

McNeil

Construction's

lack

of

competence

and/or

inadequate bid caused damage to Farmer's Mall through the removal
of lateral support, inadequate shoring and bracing, diversion of
water from Mill Creek, and inadequate replacement of soil.
75.

Bountiful City is liable in damages to Farmers for its

negligent hiring.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Work Dangerous in Absence of Special
Precautions - Bountiful City)
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76.

This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through

42 as though fully set forth herein.
77.

Bountiful

City

employed

McNeil

Construction

to

construct a Culvert behind the south wall of Farmer's Mall, which
construction Bountiful City should have recognized as likely to
create, during its progress, a peculiar risk of physical harm to
Farmers unless special precautions were taken.
78.
to

take

McNeil Construction failed to exercise reasonable care
precautions

to guard

against

the

peculiar

risk

of

physical harm to Farmer's Mall.
79.

The work performed by McNeil Construction and Bountiful

City did create physical harm to Farmer's Mall.
80.

Bountiful City is liable to Farmers for damages caused

by McNeil Construction.
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Work Withdrawing Lateral Support - Bountiful City)
81.

This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through

42 as though fully set forth herein.
82.

Bountiful City employed McNeil Construction to do work

which Bountiful City knew or should have known to be likely to
withdraw lateral support from the south wall of Farmer's Mall.
83.

McNeil Construction withdrew lateral support from the

south wall of Farmer's Mall, causing damage to Farmer's Mall.
84.
by

Bountiful City is liable to Farmers for damages caused

McNeil

Construction's

withdrawal

Farmer's Mall.
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NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Inverse Condemnation - Bountiful City)
85.

This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through

42 as though fully set forth herein.
86.

The

foreseeable

and probable consequence

and direct

result of Bountiful City's contract with McNeil Construction was
removal of soil from Farmer's property adjacent to the Mall and
the diversion of water from Mill Creek next to the Mall.
87.

Because

Bountiful

City

was

a governmental

entity,

Farmers could not prevent Bountiful City from entering onto its
land, removing its soil, and diverting water from Mill Creek next
to its Mall.
88.

The removal of Farmer's soil, diversion of water from

Mill Creek, and inadequate replacement of soil adjacent to the
wall caused damage to Farmer's building.
89.

By

contracting

above-described
private property

work,

for

and

Bountiful

causing
City

has

performance
taken

and

of

the

damaged

for public use without just compensation in

violation of the Utah Constitution, Article I, section 22.
90.

Farmers

is

entitled

to

just

compensation

for

the

damages to its property caused by Bountiful City.
TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Contract - Bountiful City)
91.

This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through

42 as though fully set forth herein.
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92.

Bountiful City has entered into several contracts with

Farmers and its predecessors in interest, whereby Bountiful City
acquired the right to maintain Mill Creek and to construct a
Culvert.
93.

By entering

into these contracts, Bountiful

City

expressly and implicitly agreed to exercise its contractual
rights fairly and in good faith and workmanlike manner.
94.

Bountiful City, by and through its own and McNeil

Construction's actons, has disregarded Farmers' right of lateral
support and has abused its easement rights.
95.

The manner and the extent by which Bountiful City, by

and through its own and McNeil Construction's actions, exercised
its rights under these right-of-way and easement contracts to
construct the Culvert Project, were arbitary and capricious and
constitute a breach of Bountiful City's contract with Farmers to
exercise Bountiful's contractual rights fairly and in good faith.
96.

Bountiful

City's breach of contract

has

damaged

Farmers.
97.

Bountiful City is liable in damages to Farmers for the

defects and damages.
ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligent Construction - Interwest Construction
and John Does 1 through 5)
98.

This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through

42 as though fully set forth herein.
99.

Interwest Construction is the general contractor who

originally constructed the Mall.
18
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100. John Does 1 through 5 are subcontractors who worked
under Interwest Construction on the construction of the Mall.
101. Interwest Construction and John Does 1 through 5 had a
duty of reasonable care to construct the Mall in a workmanlike
manner, in accordance with the Plans, and in such a way as to
cause the Mall to be structurally sound.
102. On

information

and

belief,

Farmers

alleges

that

Interwest Construction and John Does 1 through 5 breached that
duty of reasonable care by negligently constructing the Mall in a
manner that was not workmanlike, that was not in accordance with
the

Plans,

that

was

not

structurally

sound

and

that

was

foreseeable to result in damage at the time it was constructed
and in the future.
103. The negligent construction by Interwest
and

John

Does

1 through

5 has

caused

damage

Construction
to

the Mall,

including cracks in the wall and in the floor, structural stress
on the ceiling and other parts of the building, a tilting of the
south

wall,

and

other

serious

structural

problems.

These

Defendants' liability for negligent construction extends not only
to the original buyer of the Mall but also to subsequent owners,
including Farmers.
104. These Defendants are liable in damages to Farmers in
damages.
TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Contract - Interwest Construction)
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105. This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through
42 as though fully set forth herein.
106. Upon information and belief, the contract between the
Developers

and

Interwest

Construction

required

Interwest

Construction to construct the building in accordance with the
Plans.
107. Farmers

is

a

third

party

beneficiary

of

that

construction contract.
108. Interwest Construction breached its contract with the
developers and Farmers as a third party beneficiary by failing to
perform those duties more particularly described in paragraph 19
herein.
109. Accordingly,

Interwest

Construction

is

liable

in

damages to Farmers for breach of that contract.
THIRTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligence - Sharp, Sorensen & Associates)
110. This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through
42 as though fully set forth herein.
111.

Sharp, Sorensen & Associates designed

the Mall

and

prepared the Plans used by Interwest Construction, the general
contractor, who originally built the Mall.
112. Upon information and belief, as a professional entity
involved in the design, preparation of plans and specifications,
and rendering of other architectural services, with respect to
desiging the Mall building, Sharp, Sorensen & Associates owes a
duty of reasonable care in the performing of its professional
20
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services,

including

participation

in and

supervision

of

the

construction of the Mall building•
113. Sharp, Sorensen & Associates failed to participate in,
control,

supervise, and/or

influence

the construction of the

Mall.
114. The negligence of Sharp, Sorensen & Associates directly
and proximately caused damage to Farmer's Mall as previously set
forth in this Complaint.
115. Sharp, Sorensen & Associates is liable in damages to
Farmers.
FOURTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Implied Warranty of Habitability and Fitness - Merrill
W. Beck, William Compton, Interwest
Construction, Fashion Village Shopping Center,
and The Fashion Village Group)
116. This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through
42 as though fully set forth herein.
117. Interwest Construction was the general contractor who
built the Mall.
118. On information

and belief, Farmers alleges that the

original purchaser of the Mall was a business entity known as the
Fashion Village

Shopping Center in which Merrill W. Beck and

William Compton were general partners.
119. On information and belief, Farmers alleges that Merrill
W. Beck and William Compton were the persons who developed and
sold the Mall to the Fashion Village Shopping Center.
120. On information and belief, Farmers alleges that at the
times Beck and Compton sold the Mall to the original purchaser,
21
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the Mall contained hidden and latent defects that the original
purchaser could not have discovered by a reasonable inspection at
the time of sale.

These defects included, among other things, an

improper joining of the south wall to the floor and an improper
placement of backfill inside the building.
121.

The defects manifested themselves during the course of

construction of the Culvert.
122. Upon information and belief, the original purchaser was
unaware of the above-described defects at the time of the sale.
123. The above-described defects are so serious and affect
such

an

integral

part

of

the

Mall

as

to

render

the

Mall

uninhabitable by the business entities that occupy the Mall and
unfit for its intended use as a commercial structure.
124. The above-described defects were caused by the failure
of the Developers and Interwest Construction to construct
Mall

in

a workmanlike

manner,

thus,

breaching

the

the

implied

warranty of habitability and fitness for intended use applicable
to the original purchaser.
125. Farmers is entitled, as a subsequent purchaser of the
Mall,

to rely on the

implied warranties

of habitability

and

fitness for intended use that apply to the original purchaser.
126. The Fashion Village Group was the owner of the Mall
when it pledged it to Farmers as security for the $1,450,000.00
loan.
127. At the time that The Fashion Village Group conveyed the
Mall

to

Farmers by the Deed of Trust, Fashion Village
22
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either expressly or impliedly warranted that the Mall would be
free from the types of damage and structural defects previously
described in this complaint.
128. The Fashion Village Group failed to disclose to Farmers
the existence of such damage and structural defects.
129. Farmers relied on the express or implied warranties in
the Deed of Trust that the Mall would be free from such
structural and other defects, and was unaware of those defects at
the time of the loan and subsequent foreclosure.
130. The above-described defects and breach of implied and
express warranties have damaged Farmers.
131. Merrill

W.

Beck,

William

Compton,

Interwest

Construction, Fashion Village Shopping Center, and The Fashion
Village Group are liable in damages to Farmers for these defects.
PRAYER
Plaintiff prays for the following relief:
1.

For judgment in an amount not yet determined against

all Defendants for all damages caused by these Defendants,
including compensatory and consequential damages.
2.

For all reasonable costs in bringing this action,

including costs of court and reasonable attorney's fees.
3.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems

just and proper.
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DATED this Qcr

day of April, 1987.
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN

W^Wiv
James L. Christensen
Paul D. Newton
Mark J. Morrise
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's Address:
Farmers New World Life Insurance
4680 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90010
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ALLAN L. LARSON
STANLEY J. PRESTON
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Bountiful City
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
FARMERS NEW WORLD LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
AFFIDAVIT OF JACK P.
BALLING, BOUNTIFUL CITY
ENGINEER

Plaintiff,
vs.
BOUNTIFUL CITY; McNEIL CONSTRUCTION; SHARP, SORENSEN AND
ASSOCIATES; INTERWEST CONSTRUC
TION; FASHION VILLAGE SHOPPING
CENTER, a partnership; THE
FASHION VILLAGE GROUP; MERRILL
W. BECK; WILLIAM COMPTON; and
JOHN DOES 1 through 5,

Civil No. 41340

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF DAVIS

)
: ss.
)

JACK P. BALLING, being first duly sworn, deposes and states:
1.

I am a resident of the State of Utah and a citizen of

the United States, over the age of 21 years.
knowledge of the matters set forth herein.

I have personal

0f0026

2.

I am presently employed as the City Engineer for

Bountiful, Utah, and have been so employed for the past 20
years.
3.

In 1983, there was substantial flooding in Davis

County, including Bountiful City.

Fashion Village Mall in

Bountiful City was affected by the 1983 flooding when Mill
Creek, a natural water channel which runs adjacent to the Mall
and which collects and transports flood and storm water from
the surrounding area, flooded and washed out earthen banks of
the creek adjacent to the Mall and deposited substantial
amounts of debris up against the south wall of the Mall
building.

After the 1983 flood waters receded, the owners of

the Mall requested that Bountiful City rechannel Mill Creek and
install a concrete channel to avoid future flooding.
4.

Bountiful City responded to that request by informing

Mall owners that the City would include that proposed project
in its flood control construction plans, but that other more
pressing flood control problems needed to be remedied before
the Mill Creek problem at Fashion Village Mall could be
addressed.
5.

During the fall of 1985, Bountiful City decided to

install a concrete channel lining for Mill Creek at the Fashion
Village Mall location.

Bountiful City submitted plans for the

project to Davis County for approval by Davis County Flood
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Control.

Davis County approved the plans as submitted by

Bountiful City.

Davis County also gave authorization to

Bountiful City to proceed with the project and to use County
funds to pay for the project, pursuant to the Flood Control
Ordinance of Davis County.
6.

Bountiful City let bids on the project and the

contract was eventually awarded to McNeil Construction Company,
who signed a contract for this construction project on
February 27, 1986. A copy of the construction contract is
attached hereto as Exhibit "A."
7.

Under the terms of the construction contract mentioned

in the paragraph next above, the concrete channel to be
constructed by McNeil Construction Company for Mill Creek was
to be set at the same elevation as the natural bed of the creek
prior to construction.

McNeil Construction Company did have

discretion, however, in the manner in which the creek would be
diverted from its natural channel while the new concrete
channel was being constructed.

McNeil Construction decided to

divert the creek next to the south wall of the Mall while it
constructed the concrete channel contracted for.
8.

The construction project let to McNeil Construction

Company was for the exclusive purpose of improving the flood
control capabilities of Mill Creek within Bountiful City, and
particularly at the location of the Fashion Village Mall.
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control capabilities of Mill Creek within Bountiful City, and
particularly at the location of the Fashion Village Mall.

The

project was also undertaken, at least in part, as a result of
the specific request for flood control improvements to Mill
Creek by the Mall owners, made following the flooding of 1983.
9.

The Mill Creek improvement project hereinabove

described is an integral part of Bountiful City's flood and
storm system, used to collect and transport excess flood and
storm waters.
Further affiant saith not.
DATED this

2$"

day of January, 1988.

^

r»*U?.

Q^sb?^

J.ack P. Balling

" \

I 1
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s

2

7

t

day of

January,.-1988.

wonary F U D H C ;? fc .
Residing at
%&/>/+Ad

,
/luJ{
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ALLAN L. LARSON (A1896)
STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Bountiful City
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
FARMERS NEW WORLD LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF SID SMITH,
DAVIS COUNTY FLOOD
DIRECTOR

V.

BOUNTIFUL CITY, McNEIL
CONSTRUCTION, SHARP SORENSEN
AND ASSOCIATES, INTERWEST
CONSTRUCTION, FASHION VILLAGE
SHOPPING CENTER, a partnership
THE FASHION VILLAGE GROUP,
MERRILL W. BECK, WILLIAM
COMPTON, and JOHN DOES 1
through 5,
Defendant.

Civil No. 41340

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF DAVIS

)
)

ss:

Sid Smith, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and
says:
1.

Affiant is a resident of the State of Utah and a

citizen of the United States, over the age of 21 years, and has
personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein.
2.

On April 24, 1985 Davis County entered into an

agreement with Bountiful City whereby Bountiful City would design
and construct various flood control projects and Davis County
would fund 50% (fifty per cent) of the actual costs of the
projects, but not to exceed $3 57,500-00.
3.

Included in the agreement dated April 24, 1985 was a

flood control improvement project involving Milcreek at or near
the south wall of the Fashion Village Mall in Bountiful, Utah.
4.

There had been flooding in many spots along the

Milcreek channel in 1983, including the area near the south wall
of the Fashion Village Mall in Bountiful, Utah.
5.

Bountiful City represented to Davis County that the

project being designed and constructed by Bountiful City would
improve the flood control capabilities of Milcreek at many
locations, including the location in question.
6.

Bountiful City designed and constructed the

improvements along Milcreek, and flood control funds from Davis
County as well as State disaster relief funds were made available
to Bountiful City for the project.
7.

At the time the project was initiated by Bountiful

City, Davis County did not have a flood control ordinance but

each city was responsible for the flood control channels within
the jurisdiction of each.
Further, affiant sayeth not.
Dated this 3/

day
MJ of May, 1988.

y ""

/

I

Sid Smith
Subscribed and sworn to before me this O /
May, 1988

Notary Public
My Commission Expires:

Residing a t :
4L

£

t?te

,*f

day of
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FILES IN CiT-K'S OfFIC:
DAViS CQUSIYJjTAh

IS33 DEC - 8 AH 10= 0 2
ALLAN L. LARSON
STANLEY J. PRESTON
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Bountiful City
10 Exchange Places Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

BY—
:i'»l\

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
FARMERS NEW WORLD LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
BOUNTIFUL CITY'S REPLY
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
BOUNTIFUL CITY; MCNEIL
CONSTRUCTION; SHARP, SORENSEN
AND ASSOCIATES; INTERWEST
CONSTRUCTION; FASHION VILLAGE
SHOPPING CENTER, a partnership;
THE FASHION VILLAGE GROUP;
MERRILL W. BECK; WILLIAM
COMPTON; and JOHN DOES 1
through 5,

Civil No. 41340

Defendants.

Defendant Bountiful City (the "City") submits the following
reply memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The City responds to the arguments set forth in plaintiff's
opposing Memorandum by making the following points:
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1.

Plaintiff does not dispute the underlying facts which

establish that the project in question was a flood control
project within the meaning of § 63-30-3 of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act ("UGIA").
2.

In its 1984 Budget Session, the Utah Legislature

passed a "Flood Relief" bill adding a second paragraph to
§ 63-30-3. This Amendment by its express terms grants absolute
immunity to flood control projects.

Plaintiff fails to cite,

nor is the City aware of, a single case in Utah in the last
four years since this Amendment was passed, which has held that
flood control projects are entitled only to qualified immunity.

To the contrary, every case in Utah which has dealt with

this issue, to the City's knowledge, has held that this
Amendment grants absolute immunity to flood control projects.
Accordingly, the City is entitled to summary judgment in this
action.
3.

As a separate ground for summary judgment, plaintiff's

inverse condemnation action fails for the following reasons:
(a) There is, plainly and unequivocally, in the State
of Utah, no cause of action arising under the bare language of
Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution.
(b) That clause does not, in any event, permit suits
based upon the tortious conduct of the agents of governmental
entities.

-2-

oroQ34

(c) The 1987 enactment known as § 63-30-10.5,
paralleling as it does Article I, Section 22 of the
Constitution, carries the same meaning and effect as the
constitutional section, and is therefore limited to actions
referable to a government's power of eminent domain.

It cannot

provide a basis for actions based upon tortious conduct.

This

meaning is further clarified by the reference in that section
to Utah's Eminent Domain Law.
(d) The 1987 enactment of §63-30-10.5 cannot be
retroactively applied.
(e) Plaintiff's reliance on an inverse condemnation
claim under the federal constitution is inappropriate because
no such claim is currently contained in plaintiff's complaint.
In any event, plaintiff has failed to cite any cases which
stand for the proposition that the Federal Constitution permits
inverse condemnation suits based upon negligently tortious
conduct.
ARGUMENT
I.
PLAINTIFF DOES NOT DISPUTE THAT THE PROJECT
IN QUESTION WAS A FLOOD CONTROL PROJECT
WITHIN THE MEANING OF § 63-30-3.
In its original Memorandum, the City set forth in detail
the facts necessary to establish that the Milcreek construction
project was a flood control project.
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affidavits of Bountiful City Engineer, Jack Balling, and Davis
County Flood Control Director, Sid Smith.

Plaintiff did not

directly controvert any of these facts in its opposing
Memorandum.

Plaintiff did state that two of the documents

relied upon the City are unsupported by Affidavit and therefore
cannot be used to support the City's position.
The City submits that the flood control nature of this
project can be established independent of the two documents in
question.

In any event, to the extent these documents must be

supported by affidavit, the City has cured the questions raised
by plaintiff by submitting the Supplemental Affidavit of Jack
Balling, filed concurrently herewith, which verifies the two
documents in question.

Thus, all of the facts relied upon by

Bountiful City in its original Memorandum are undisputed by
plaintiff.

These facts establish without question that the

Milcreek construction project was a flood control project
within the meaning of § 63-30-3.
II.
SECTION 63-30-3 OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT, AS AMENDED, GRANTS THE CITY
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FOR ITS CONSTRUCTION,
REPAIR AND OPERATION OF FLOOD AND STORM
SYSTEMS.
During its 1984 Budget Session, the Utah Legislature passed
a "Flood Relief" bill that contained an amendment to § 63-30-3
of the UGIA.

As the City noted in its original Memorandum,
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this Amendment added a second paragraph to § 63-30-3, which
reads as follows:
The management of flood waters and the construction,
repair and operation of flood and storm systems by
governmental entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental entities and their
officers and employees are immune from suit from any
injury or damage resulting from those activities.
In enacting the 1984 Amendment to § 63-30-3, the Utah
Legislature was responding to the severe flood problems which
began in the spring of 1983, and which caused Governor Matheson
to declare a state of emergency.

The State of Utah and its

political subdivisions then responded by commencing extraordinary efforts to prevent flood damage and to ensure the public
safety.

The language used by the Legislature in § 63-30-3

could not be any more certain or unambiguous.

The intent is

clearly to preserve sovereign immunity from suit for any injury
or damage resulting from the management of flood waters and the
construction, repair and operation of flood and storm systems
by governmental entities.
In its original Memorandum, the City discussed the applicable law interpreting the construction of Utah statutes which
establishes that this Amendment grants absolute immunity for
flood control projects. Without citing any case law in support
of its analysis, plaintiff would have this court interpret the
Amendment so as to grant only qualified immunity to flood
control projects.

Such an interpretation renders meaningless
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the last phrase of the amended paragraph wherein the Utah
Legislature stated that "governmental entities and their
officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or
damage resulting from those activities."
The interpretation advanced by the City has been universally accepted by the Utah District Courts which have repeatedly ruled on this issue during the four years since the 1984
Amendment was passed.

Plaintiff has failed to cite a single

case agreeing with plaintiff's "qualified immunity" interpretation of the Amendment.

To the City's knowledge, no Utah

District Court has ever so held.

In its original Memorandum,

the City attached the rulings of thirteen (13) separate
District: Court Judges in the Second, Third, and Fourth District
Courts in the State of Utah which have all held that this
Amendment grants absolute immunity to flood control projects.
Since the filing of its original Memorandum, the City has
learned that three (3) other District Court Judges have also
held that the Amendment grants absolute immunity.

See Williams

v. Carbon County Board of Education, Civil No. 15187, (7th
District Court of Utah, June 15, 1987) (the Hon. Boyd Bunell,
Judge); Hansen v. Salt Lake County (3d District Court of Utah,
October 22, 1985) (the Hon. Dean E. Conder, Judge); and Irvin
v. Salt Lake County, (3d District Court of Utah) (the Hon.
David B. Dee, Judge);
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Based upon this great weight of authority, the City submits
that its interpretation of the 1984 Amendment to § 63-30-3 is
the correct one.
Significantly, the 1984 Amendment gave statutory expression
to the common law principle that the sovereign has full immunity from suit for the management of flood waters.

This princi-

pal of law was established in Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483,
134 P. 626 (1913), which held that the sovereign was immune in
a situation where the plaintiff claimed damages resulting from
the State's actions and construction of a flume, or culvert and
undershot, for the purpose of protecting a canal against flood
water, i.e., the construction and operation of a storm and
flood system.

Subsequently, governmental entities were still

held by the Utah Supreme Court to be immune from suit in cases
involving flood control or flood systems.

See e.g., McKell v.

Spanish Fork City, 305 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1957).

The 1984

Amendment merely clarified or amplified that rule of law to
insure that the principle remain intact under the statutory
framework of the UGIA.
In its opposing Memorandum, plaintiff argues that the immunity granted flood control projects under 1984 Amendment is
waived by § 63-30-5 (waiver for contractual obligations),
§ 63-30-7 (waiver for defective structures), § 63-30-10 (waiver
for injury caused by the negligence of an employee), and
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§ 63-30-10.5 (waiver for inverse condemnation).

To the

contrary, it is clear that the Utah Legislature's specific
grant of immunity contained in § 63-30-3 for flood control
activities supersedes the general waiver of immunity contained
in § 63-30-5, -7, -10 and -10.5.

As a result of the

Legislature's grant of absolute immunity, application of any
expressed waivers of immunity are barred.

These waivers are

applicable only where the qualified immunity of the first
paragraph § 63-30-3 attaches. Again, this is the interpretation supported by the holdings of the numerous Utah District
Court cases cited by the City.

Thus, because § 63-30-3 grants

absolute immunity to flood control projects, plaintiff's
complaint against the City fails in its entirety and the Court
need not concern itself with the other arguments advanced in
plaintiff's opposing Memorandum.
Before leaving this point, the City does note that plaintiff's breach of contract claim is particulary weak.

This

claim is based upon a Right-of-Way Agreement, copies of which
were attached to both the City's and plaintiff's original
Memoranda.

A review of this document, however, reveals that it

is nothing more than an easement granted by the plaintiff to
the City to perform the very flood control work which plaintiff
had previously requested.
parties.

It is not a contract between the

Under the express terms of this easement, the City
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has no obligations.
by the City.

In fact, the document is not even signed

More importantly, the claims made by the plain-

tiff against the City sound in tort, specifically negligence,
not breach of contract.
hide this point.

Plaintiff's strained analysis cannot

In addition, all the Utah cases cited by

plaintiff in support of the breach of contract claim are
distinguishable from the present case.

The cases cited all

involved written contracts between the parties, where the
governmental entities had express obligations under the term of
the contracts. None involved easements.

In any event, the

issue is moot given the absolute immunity granted by the 1984
Amended to § 63-30-3.
III.
THERE IS NO INVERSE CONDEMNATION ACTION FOR
NEGLIGENTLY TORTIOUS CONDUCT IN THE STATE OF
UTAH.
Plaintiff goes to considerable length to set forth its
position that it can assert an action for inverse condemnation
under the facts of this case. Though the City maintains that
the point is moot given the absolute immunity of § 63-30-3, it
nonetheless addresses this issue as a separate ground for
granting summary judgment on the inverse condemnation claim.
Contrary to plaintiff's labored analysis, Utah case law clearly
establishes that inverse condemnation under the facts of this
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case is not actionable.

Specifically, the Utah Supreme Court

has held that Article I, § 22 of the Utah Constitution is not
self executing.
The Utah case law on this issue is stated in the opinions
of Utah Supreme Court Justices Henriod and Wade.

Their

opinions, concurring opinions, dissents, rebuttals, etc., in
Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 349 P.2d 157 (Utah 1960);
Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 354 P.2d 105 (Utah 1960); and
State Road Commission v. Parker, 368 P.2d 585 (Utah 1962)
firmly establish the application and meaning of Article I,
Section 22 of Utah's Constitution.
upheld by the Utah Supreme Court.
dissent, he was alone.

Justice Henroid's view was
When Justice Wade was in

The Court's position is, without

qualification, equivocation, or condition, that sovereign
immunity protects governmental entities in the State of Utah
from suits brought for the purpose of obtaining compensation
for the taking or damaging of private property for public use;
and that Article I, Section 22 cf the Utah Constitution is not
self-executing so as to constitute a waiver of that immunity.
Further, the cases clearly set forth the rule that consent for
the state (governmental entities) to be sued is a legislative
matter, and will not be created nor inferred by the courts.
These holdings were based upon the precedents of Wilkinson
v. State, 134 Pac. 626 (Utah 1913); Campbell Building Co. v.
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State Road Commission, 70 P.2d 857 (Utah 1937); State v State
Road

Commission v. District Court/ Fourth Judicial District,

78 P.2d 502 (Utah 1937); Bingham v. Board of Education, 223
p.2d 432 (Utah 1950); Hjorth v. Whittenberg, 241 P.2d 907 (Utah
1952); These holdings continued, without any change whatsoever,
up to the passage by the Legislature of the Governmental
Immunity Act (§ 63-30-1 et seq., Utah Code, 1953).

See Hurst

v. Highway Department, 397 P.2d 71 (Utah 1964); and Sine v
Helland, 418 P.2d 979 (Utah 1966).

The UGIA then "substituted

a statutory framework" for the common law of sovereign immunity
existing prior thereto in the State, "to be interpreted by the
courts and reshaped by the Legislature as necessary from time
to time." Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983), 629-630.
Upon its enactment in 1965, this statutory framework for
governmental immunity did not provide consent for the sovereign
to be sued for "taking" or "damaging" private property for
public use.

The Act retained sovereign immunity, except as

waived therein.

(§ 63-30-3, Utah Code, 1953).

As a result,

the Utah Supreme Court found no basis in the UGIA to permit a
suit pursuant to Article I, Section 22.

In Holt v. Utah State

Road Commission, 522 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1973), the Court stated,
The law has long been established in this State that
under (the claim of- taking of property without compensation) there can be no recovery from the State for
damages . . . . Sufficient has been said as to the
pro and con of this subject that we think it unnecessary and undesirable to extenuate thereon, but refer
to the adjudicated cases.
-11-
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The Court's reference is to the following cases:

State v.

Fourth District Court, supra; Hjorth v. Whittenberg,

supra;

Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, supra; Springville Banking Co.
v. Burton, supra; State v. Parker, supra; and Anderson
Investment Corp. v. State of Utah, 503 P.2d 144 (Utah 1972).
In deciding Holt, the Court guoted the language of § 63-30-3,
"Except as may be otherwise provided in this act . . . for any
injury which may result from . . . the exercise . . . of a
governmental function" to indicate the legislature's intention
that the Act be strictly construed to preserve sovereign
immunity and to waive it only as clearly expressed therein.
Holt, supra, at 1287-1288.
It is thus clear that the Utah Supreme Court has never
recognized Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution as a
waiver of sovereign immunity.

No doubt many have chafed, and

my chafe, under this fact. Many may think it is bad law, oldfashioned law, harsh law, etc.

However those thoughts have all

been expressed to the Utah Supreme Court, and the Court has
rejected all such claims to steadfastly hold to the principle
that governments are immune from suit until and unless immunity
is waived by the legislature.

The arguments, pro and con, are

well covered in the Springville Banking, Fairclough, and Parker
cases cited above.

Particularly appropos to the argument

against plaintiff's position is the language of Justice Henroid
in Springville Banking, at 171:
-12-
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The doctrine of stare decisis and the solemn pronouncements of this court stretching over a period of nearly
half a century, and authored by such respected
justices as Justice Frick in the Wilkinson case, Judge
Hoyt in the Fourth District case, and Justice Folland
in the Campbell case, not to mention the innumerable
other justices who have on many, many occasions said
that the sovereign could not be sued under a
constitutional provision that says "private property
shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation" should not be treated as lightly as
Justice Wade treats them by seeking cases from other
jurisdictions to gather strange constitutional provisions which are strangely different from our own in
order to construe a constitutional provision that we
have construed four or five times.
Further, in Parker, supra, at p. 589, Justice Henroid
remarked, "Advocacy for a personally desired result is a poor
substitute for stare decisis, or for the emasculation of
legislation which has been interpreted time and again by this
court • . . ."
Thus, there is absolutely no basis for plaintiff in this
case to seek or obtain recovery from Bountiful City pursuant to
Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution.
Plaintiff also contends that the 1987 enactment of
§ 63-30-10.5 now authorizes the maintenance of a suit for the
"taking" or "damage" of private property for public use without
just compensation.

The City concurs that such a suit may be

brought if the Legislature has enacted appropriate enabling
legislation.

In the instant case however, the said

§ 63-30-10.5 is of no avail to plaintiff for two reasons: (1)
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The statute gives rise to a new cause of action which did not
exist prior to 1987, and (2) the statute does not contemplate
suits sounding in tort, or negligence.
The principles relating to retroactive application of laws
enacted by the Legislature are settled.

As stated in Okland

Construction Company v. Industrial Commission, 520 P.2d 108
(Utah 1974), a later statute or amendment should not be applied
in a retroactive manner to deprive a party of his rights or
impose a greater liability upon him; however, that principle
has no application when the later statute or amendment deals
only with a clarification or amplification as to how the law
should have been understood prior to its enactment.

This Court

stated in Carlucci v. Utah State Industrial Commission, 725
P.2d 1335 (Utah 1986) ,
(T)he law establishing substantive rights and liabilities when a cause of action arises, and not a subsequently enacted statute, governs the resolution of a
dispute . . . . (H)owever . . . statutes which are
procedural only and do not create, alter, or destroy
substantive rights may be applied to courses of action
that: have accrued or are pending at the time the
statute is enacted, (emphasis added).
In the instant case, prior to 1987, sovereign immunity
barred a suit against a governmental entity for recovery of
compensation or the "taking" or "damaging" of private property
for public use.

The 1987 enactment of § 63-30-10.5 created a

substantive right which theretofore had not existed.

-14-
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should not be applied retroactively to this case, where the
project in question was undertaken in 1985, two years before
this amendment.
Secondly, in a proper case for application of § 63-30-10.5,
it is clear that the act is meant to cover only those "takings"
or "damagings" occurring pursuant to the sovereign power of
eminent domain.

This is evident from the wording of the sta-

tute, being nearly identical to Article I, Section 22 of the
Utah Constitution; by its inclusion, by reference, of the Utah
Eminent Domain law as the basis whereby compensation shall be
assessed; and by its placement within the framework of the UGIA.
A generalized reference to "taking" or "damage" cases
arising under state constitutional clauses similar to Utah's
Article I, Section 22, reveals a completely bewildering maze of
decisions which reflect either the eagerness or restraint of
courts in other jurisdictions in using such clauses as a means
of circumventing sovereign immunity.

One scholar has stated

that inverse condemnation law is an "artificiality" created
largely to evade sovereign immunity.
Condemnation:

Van Alstyne, "Inverse

Unintended Physical Damage," 20 Hastings L.J./

431, 515 (1969).

As shown herein, the Utah Supreme Court

refused steadfastly to allow such an artificiality to develop.
The question now is, does § 63-30-10.5 of the UGIA permit
this court to now enter into that "artificiality" of inverse
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condemnation law which swallows up governmental immunity
through an interpretation that says, in effect, that any time a
governmental entity performs any function, and property is
damaged in the process, no matter how, when or why the damage
occurs, there has been a "taking" or "damage" requiring "just
compensation?"
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should not
take such an approach.

The history of inverse condemnation law

in this state has already been traced herein.

And, it is perti-

nent to note that even Justice Wade, who contended hardest for
allowance of a suit in inverse condemnation, would not permit
it to extend to cases sounding in tort or negligence.

In his

concurring opinion in Springville Banking, Justice Wade said,
at 349 P.2d 157, 166:
Such compensation must result from or grow out of a
public use of property, either the property taken or
other property used for a public purpose . . . . Such
public use must be one the state is entitled to make,
and it must be intentionally made by the duly constituted public officers and not be merely the result of
negligence or other wrongful acts which create
ordinary tort liability. (emphasis added).
In his dissent in Fairclouch, Justice Wade said, at 354
P.2d 105, 110-111:
This provision (Article I, Section 22, Utah
Constitution) clearly requires the taking or damaging
of tangible private property, and that the public use
must be intentional and not merely accidental or
negligently caused. So damages from personal injuries
or from breach of contract and all damages except from
an intentional public use are not included in such
consent . . . .
-16-
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. . . (I)t is generally recognized that accidental or
negligent injury is not a damage to private property
for a public use. So that case has no bearing on our
problem.
Where the governmental activity complained of was no more
than negligent performance of public duties and was unrelated
to any deliberate taking or necessary damaging of appellant's
property for a public use, and where the damage wrought was not
a necessary consequence or result of the public undertaking,
the claim for damages is a claim in tort and should not be
given constitutional status.

See Harris v. United States, 205

F.2d 765, 767-68 (10th Cir. 1953); Havashi v. Alameda County
Flood Control and Water Cons. Dist., (67 Cal. App. 2d 584, 334
P.2d 1048, 1053 (1959); Dallas County Flood Control Dist. v.
Benson, 157 Tex. 617, 306 S.W. 2d 350, 351 (1957); Chavez v,
City of Laramie, 359 P.2d 23, 25 (Wyo. 1964).
In Lund v. Salt Lake County, 200 P. 510 (Utah 1921),
plaintiff sued to recover damages for injury to certain fish
ponds and destruction of fish alleged to have resulted from the
county's flushing of water through a reservoir owned and
controlled by the county, which water entered an overflow ditch
and eventually reached plaintiff's ponds.

Plaintiff's com-

plaint claimed a right of recovery pursuant to Article I,
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution.

The Utah Supreme Court

rejected this claim without any discussion of sovereign
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immunity.

The Court said the case must be examined within the

law regulating the exercise of eminent domain.

Fundamental

principles of that law, said the Court, require that the
property taken be taken for a public use, that the structure or
work causing the injury be for a public purpose, that it be
authorized by law, and that the damage for which compensation
was claimed be a necessary consequence of the public use.

"We

are clearly of the opinion that the damages for which
compensation is allowed under Article I, Section 22, of the
State Constitution are such as are the direct consequences of
the lawful exercise of the right of eminent domain, and that
ordinarily such damages are unavoidable." Ld. at 514.
Section 63-30-10.5 of the UGIA has not enlarged this view
of the type of "takings" or "damages" for which compensation
may now be sought.

The reference in the statute is to Utah's

Eminent Domain law for compensation and assessment of damages.
That entire chapter contemplates payment for the taking and
damage of private property only for public use that:

(1) is

authorized by law, and (2) is necessary for such public use.
(§ 78-34-4).

There is nothing in the chapter to expand

§ 63-30-10.5 into a basis for recovery of compensation resulting from negligent or accidental "taking" or "damage".

Thus

§ 63-30-10.5 should be construed as Justice Wade would have
construed Article I, Section 22, and as did the Court in Lund
v. Salt Lake County, supra.
-18-
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It is clear, therefore, that there is no Utah precedent
which would now push this court into the "artificiality" of
inverse condemnation law as it has developed in other jurisdictions as a means to evade sovereign immunity.

In fact, it

is clear that prior Justices of the Utah Supreme Court, as well
as the Legislature which enacted § 63-30-10.5, intended that
inverse condemnation not apply to damages arising from negligence, accident, unlawful or unauthorized acts, or which are
not the intended consequence of lawful and authorized takings
of property for public use.

Section 63-30-10.5 merely takes

its place within the statutory framework of sovereign immunity
provided by the UGIA.

That section waives immunity only in

that limited area of "takings" or "damagings" arising out of
the lawful exercise of eminent domain power.

In all other

areas of governmental activity, governmental immunity is
determined by other relevant provisions of the UGIA.

By thus

applying § 63-30-10.5 as a part of the overall framework of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, this court will not be caught
up in the confusion and injustice which arises from the mixture
of inverse and tort liabilities of governments.

See Van

Alstyne, supra, at 508.
Finally, in its opposing Memorandum plaintiff asserts that
it has a claim for inverse condemnation under United States
Constitution.

Significantly no such claim is currently
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contained in plaintiff's complaint.

The fact that plaintiff is

trying to amend his complaint to add such a claim is not a
defense to the City's Summary Judgment Motion where permission
to amend has not been granted.

In any event, plaintiff cites

no authority for the proposition, nor is the City aware of any
such authority, that the Federal Constitution allows inverse
condemnation actions for negligently tortious conduct.

In

short, the same reasoning set forth above applies equally to
the Federal Constitution as to the Utah Constitution.
Plaintiff does cite the case of First English of Angelico
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S.
Ct. Rpt. 2378 (1987); however, this case does not support the
actionability of an inverse condemnation claim under the facts
of this case.

First English was an eminent domain case arising

out a deliberate, intentional taking.

Specifically, it

involved a claim against a county flood control district
wherein the landowner asserted that the district's temporary,
regulatory ordinance prohibiting construction on the landowner's property deprived the landowner of all use of its
property.

Obviously, this case does not support the propo-

sition that plaintiff is entitled to file an inverse condemnation action based on the alleged negligent actions of the
City in the construction of a culvert, because there is no
deliberate, intentional taking.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the City respectively submits it is
entitled to summary judgment in this action.
DATED this ^ ^ d a y of August, 1988.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

ByStanley $y. Preston
Attorneys for Defendant
Bountiful City
SCMSJP76
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In the District Court of the Second Judicial District
IN AND FOR THE

County of Davis, State of Utah

FARMERS NEW WORLD L I F E I N S ,

MINUTE ENTRY
A u g u s t 3 0 , 1988

Plaintiff
vs.

Date
Case No.

BOUNTIFUL CITY et. al.
Defendant

41340

RODNEY S. PAGE, Judge

Hal Rees, Reporter
Leslie Snow, Clerk

This is the time set for hearing on a Motion for Summary
Judgment. Mark Maurice is present for the plaintiff and Stan
Preston and Layne Forbes are present for the defendant.
Arguments are made by counsel. Court finds that this is an
action which resulted as a direct response to the flooding in
1983. Section 63-30-3 was in direct response to the floods which
section provides that those actions are entitled to governmental
immunity. Court finds there is no basis for the implied contract
and Court will grant the motion for summary judgment provided
that the Court will allow plaintiff 10 days to amend complaint as
to the Fifth Amendment. Mr. Preston is to prepare the order.
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ALLAN L. LARSON
STANLEY J. PRESTON
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Bountiful City
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
FARMERS NEW WORLD LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.
BOUNTIFUL CITY; MCNEIL
CONSTRUCTION; SHARP, SORENSEN
AND ASSOCIATES; FASHION VILLAGE
SHOPPING CENTER, a partnership;
THE FASHION VILLAGE GROUP;
MERRILL W. BECK; WILLIAM
COMPTON; and JOHN DOES 1
through 5,

Civil No. 41340

Defendants.

Defendant Bountiful City's Motion for Summary Judgment
came on regularly for hearing before the above-entitled Court,
the Honorable Rodney S. Page presiding, on August 30, 1988.
Plaintiff was represented by Mark J. Morrise.

Defendant Bountiful

City was represented by Stanley J. Preston.
The Court having reviewed the file, pleadings, memoranda,
and affidavits on file, having heard oral argument of counsel, and
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being fully advised, concludes as follows:
(a)

Section 63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity

Act, as amended in 19 84, provides absolute immunity to governmental
entites from suit for any injury or damage resulting from the
construction, repair and operation of a flood and storm system,
or the mancigement of flood waters, and that plaintiff's allegations
against Bountiful City fall within the absolute immunity provisions
of §63-30-3.

There are no material facts in dispute sufficient

to overcome application of this statutory grant of absolute
immunity in this case.

Accordingly, Bountiful City is immune

from suit for the injury or damage complained of by plaintiff
here.
(b)

Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution

is not self-executing.

Accordingly, plaintiff's claim for inverse

condemnation against Bountiful City is not actionable under the
Utah Constitution.

Even if Section 22 were self-executing,

inverse condemnation actions thereunder would be limited to
situations arising out of the taking or damaging of tangible
private property for public use, intentionally made by public
officers, and would not extend to actions arising out of negligently tortious conduct.
(c)

Section 63-30-10.5 of the Governmental Immunity

Act, to the extent it does authorize inverse condemnation actions,
is limited in this same manner as Article I, Section 22 of the
Utah Constitution, as set forth in subparagraph

(b) above.

Moreover, § 63-30-10.5, which was added to the Utah Governmental
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Immunity Act in 1987, creates new substantive rights and is not
retroactive to the claims against Bountiful City made in this
case, which arise from actions pre-dating the 1987 Amendment,
(d)

There is no basis for an implied contract claim

against Bountiful City given the nature of the dealings between
the parties and the remote relationship between Bountiful City
and plaintiff.
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that
Bountiful City's Motion for Summary Judgment is well taken, and
as a matter of law, should be granted.

However, the Court notes

that plaintiff has filed a Motion to Amend its Complaint against
Bountiful City in which it seeks to add a claim for inverse
condemnation under Article V of the United States Constitution.
The Court concludes that plaintiff shall have ten days from the
date of this Order to amend its Complaint to assert such a claim.
WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED,
that the causes of action asserted against Bountiful City in
plaintiff's Complaint be, and hereby are, dismissed with prejudice
and on the merits.

however, plaintiff is granted ten days from

the date of this Order to file an Amended Complaint in which it
may assert only a claim against Bountiful City for inverse
condemnation under Article V of the United States Constitution.
In the event no such Amended Complaint is filed within said
ten-day period, then a final judgment shall be, and hereby is,
entered in favor of Bountiful City and against plaintiff, no
-3-
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cause of action, each party to bear its own costs.
DATED this

\S

day of September, 198 8, by the

Court.

Rodney S ^ a t f e , District Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN

By:
Paul D. Newfon
Mark J. Morrise
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Farmers New World Life
Insurance Company
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James L. Christensen, USB No. A0639
Paul D. Newton, USB No. 4382
Mark J. Morrise, USB No. 3840
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
215 South State Street, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 534-0909
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
FARMERS NEW WORLD LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

]
]
1
)

BOUNTIFUL CITY, McNEIL
]
CONSTRUCTION, SHARP SORENSEN ])
AND ASSOCIATES, INTERWEST
CONSTRUCTION, FASHION VILLAGE ')
SHOPPING CENTER, a partnership
THE FASHION VILLAGE GROUP,
MERRILL W. BECK, WILLIAM
COMPTON, and JOHN DOES 1
through 5,

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Civil No. 41340
Judge Rodney S. Page

Defendants.
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Plaintiff complains of Defendants as follows:
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

Farmers New World Life Insurance Company

("Farmers"),

is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
State of Washington.
2.

Bountiful City is a municipal corporation of the State

of Utah and is located in Davis County, State of Utah,
3.

McNeil

Construction

is a Utah

corporation with its

principal place of business in Davis County, State of Utah.
4.

Interwest Construction is a Utah corporation with its

principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
5.

Sharp, Sorensen

and Associates, fka Sharp/Pinegar

&

Associates, is a Utah corporation with its principal place of
business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
6.

Fashion

partnership

Village

registered

Shopping

Center

is a Utah

limited

with the Davis County Clerk, State of

Utah.
7.

The

Fashion Village Group

is a limited

partnership

registered with the Davis County Clerk, State of Utah.
8.

Merrill

W. Beck

is an individual

residing

in Davis

County, State of Utah.
9.

William

W. Compton

is believed

residing in the State of Pennsylvania.
3

to be an

individual

0 n 0031

10.

John Does 1 through 5 are unknown persons or entities

who Farmers shall join in this action once it learns of their
identities.
11.

The acts that are the subject of this dispute occurred

in Davis County, State of Utah.
12.

Jurisdiction

is proper pursuant to § 78-3-4 of Utah

Code Annotated.
13.

Venue is proper pursuant to §§ 78-12-1(1) and 78-13-7

of the Utah Code Annotated.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
A. Construction of Building.
14.

On

or

about April

28, 1977, the

architect,

Sharp,

Sorensen & Associates, prepared the original plans and drawings
("Plans") for the construction of a commercial building upon real
property located at approximately 500 South 200 West, Bountiful,
Utah, which property was owned by Merrill W. Beck and William
Compton.
15.
employed

Merrill W. Beck and William Compton (the "Developers")
Interwest Construction to build a commercial

building

pursuant to the Plans.
16.

Thereafter, Interwest Construction built a commercial

building on the above real property now known as Fifth South

4
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Plaza fka Fashion Square Village (hereinafter the real property
and buildings shall be collectively referred to as ("the Mall").
17*

Several

feet from and running parallel to the south

wall of the Mall is a waterway known as "Mill Creek."
18.

The Plans required Interwest Construction to do, among

other things, the following:
a.

Install

and

grout

reinforced

steel

in

certain

cells in the hollow, precast wall panels;
b.

Install

and grout

"L" shaped

steel dowels into

these grouted cells and into the floor slab;
c.

Improve Mill Creek; and

d.

Install an outside clean-out for the sewer line at

the southwest corner of the building.
19.

Upon information and belief and contrary to the Plans,

Interwest Construction:
a.

Did not install reinforced

steel in all of the

required cells in the wall panels;
b.

Did not group the reinforced steel in all of the

required wall panels;
c.

Did not tie dowels into the walls and the floor;

d.

Did not grout the dowels in the wall panels;

e.

Did not improve the channel of Mill Creek;

5
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f.

Did not install an outside clean-out for the sewer

line at the southwest corner of the building; and
g.

Did not perform other matters to be

discovered

during the pendency of this litigation.
20.
north

Trees, vegetation, and foliage which grew between the

bank

of

Mill

Creek

and

the

south

wall

of

the

Mall

stabilized the soil between the Mall and Mill Creek.
B. Transfer of Ownership of Mall.
21.

From about July 11, 1977 through September 11, 1979,

Merrill W. Beck and William Compton conveyed the Mall to Fashion
Village Shopping Center, a limited partnership.
22.

On

or

about

September

11,

1979,

Fashion

Village

Shopping Center, a limited partnership, conveyed the mall to The
Fashion Village Group.
23.

On

or

about

January

31, 1980, Farmers

loaned

The

Fashion Village Group $1,450,000.00, secured by a Deed of Trust
on the Mall.
24.

On

or

about

January

10, 1983, Larry

G.

Moore,

as

successor trustee under the above Deed of Trust, conveyed title
to the Mall to Farmers by way of a Trustee's Deed.
C. Construction of Culvert.
25.

On or

about March

29, 1973, Grea

Dick

Corporation

conveyed to Bountiful City a perpetual right-of-way and easement
6
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for any and all city, municipal, and utility purposes over a
portion of the Mall.
26.

On or

about

October

16, 1975, Valley

Corporation

conveyed to Bountiful City a perpetual right-of-way and easement
for the use of utility

lines and creek maintenance

across a

portion of the Mall.
27.

On or about October 17, 1985, Farmers, at the request

of Bountiful City, executed a right-of-way agreement for a creek
easement, which agreement conveyed to Bountiful City "a perpetual
right-of-way

and easement

for the purpose of digging,

laying

concrete, connecting to and maintaining, cleaning and operation
[sic] a creek drainage facility."
28.
Bountiful
easement

Upon information and belief, prior to October 17, 1985,
City
over

had acquired
Mill

Creek

a prescriptive

for the purpose

right-of-way
of

and

maintaining,

operating, repairing, improving, and replacing the same.
29.

During the fall of 1985, Bountiful City advertised for

and took bids from various contractors for the construction of a
culvert and/or concrete channel lining ("Culvert") in Mill Creek.
The segment of Mill Creek's channel to be lined included the
entire segment adjacent to the south wall of the mall.
30.

After

receiving

bids,

Bountiful

Culvert project to McNeil Construction.
7

City

awarded

the

O n CCGj

31.

By the construction contract for the Culvert project,

Bountiful City required McNeil Construction to do, among other
things, the following:
a.
as may

To shore up, brace, underpin, sheet, and protect

be necessary

existing

structures

all

foundations

adjacent

and

and other

adjoining

parts of

the

side

of

all
the

project, which are in any way affected by the excavations or
other operations connected with the completion of the work under
the contract;
b.
from

the

To indemnify Bountiful City for any damages caused

loss of

lateral

support

of

adjoining

property

and

consequent damages to adjacent structures;
c.

To

provide

immediate,

adequate

protective

construction, or to reinforce any shoring, bracing or sheeting as
required by the engineer of Bountiful City;
d.

To divert Mill Creek so as to avoid

damage to

adjoining property;
e.

To

avoid

use of broken

concrete

asphalt, used

reinforcing steel, and other rubble and debris as backfill;
f.

To scarify the fill area to a depth of six inches

compacted to a specified density and in a specified manner;
g.

To grade the site work area by hand to specified

8
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elevations, slopes and contours to effectuate proper drainage;
and
h.

To use trench digging machines only if they will

not cause damage to structures above or below the ground.
32.

Before

the commencement

Culvert project, the entire

of the construction

south wall

of the Mall

several feet below the surface of the adjacent soil.
which

formed

the

north

embankment

to Mill

Creek,

of the
extended

This soil,
provided

important subjacent lateral support to the exterior of the south
wall by offsetting interior lateral pressure from backfill inside
the wall.
33.

Contrary to the construction contract for the Culvert

project, McNeil Construction:
a.

Did not install bracing or shoring to support the

Mall after excavating and removing the soil between Mill Creek
and the south wall of the Mall;
b.

Diverted water from Mill Creek directly next to

and against the building;
c.

Included broken concrete, debris, rubble, etc. in

the backfill;
d.

Did not compact soil used as backfill to required

density and in specified manner;
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e.

Did not grade the site work areas to specified

elevations, slopes, and contours;
f.

Used

trench digging machines which damaged

the

Mall.
34.

The water which McNeil Construction diverted from Mill

Creek directly against the south wall of the Mall seeped through
spaces between

the wall's

concrete panels

and

caused

"hydro

compacting" of the fill material inside the wall and underneath
the floor.
35.
Mall

Prior to the soil adjacent to the south wall of the

being

replaced,

Farmers

discovered

damage

to

the

Mall

structure caused by removal of lateral support to the south wall
and diversion of Mill Creek directly against the Mail's south
wall.

This damage included cracks in the south wall and adjacent

floor, tilting of wall panels, holes in the wall panels, and
undue

structural

stress

throughout

the

building,

which

may

continue to occur.
36.

Only

after

Farmers

had

made

several

demands

upon

Bountiful City did McNeil Construction place backfill between the
Culvert and the south wall of the Mall.
37.

The new backfill

provided much

less

lateral

support

than the original soil adjacent to the south wall because the
amount of new backfill was less than the original amount of soil,
10
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was

of

poor

grade,

and

was without

significant

density

or

compaction.
38 •

Due to the acts or omissions of one or more of the

defendants, the fill under the floors in the Mall has recently
settled, leaving a void between the floor slab and the fill, thus
changing

the

slope

of

the main

sewer

drain

individual unit pipes from the main drainage.

and

separating

Raw sewage and

water has flowed into the soil instead of the main drain, and use
of restroom facilities for certain tenants in the Mall has been
disrupted.
39.

Farmers has been damaged by the acts or failure to act

of one or more of the defendants, which damages include, but are
not limited to:
the Mall; and
walls,

(1) loss of income; (2) diminution in value of
(3) cost of repair to the Mall T s roof, floors,

plumbing,

sewer,

and

fill;

and, but

not

limited to,

reclamation of vegetation behind the south wall of the Mall.
40.

Farmers has given notice of most of the defects to all

the known Defendants; and not one has offered to remedy them.
41.

Farmers also has satisfied the notice requirements of

§§ 63-30-11 and 63-30-13 of Utah Code Annotated.
42.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, § 63-30-14, the claim

submitted to Bountiful City is deemed denied because Bountiful

11
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City or its insurance carrier has failed to approve or deny the
claim.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligence - McNeil Construction)
43.

This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through

42 as though fully set forth herein.
44.

By virtue of the contract between Bountiful City and

McNeil Construction, McNeil Construction agreed to perform the
details of the contract, especially

in regard

means and manner of shoring and bracing

to the method,

adjacent

foundations,

walls and structures.
45.

In performing

the

excavation

and

construction

work

adjacent to the Mall, McNeil Construction owed Farmers a duty of
reasonable care to not damage or injure the Mall.
46.

McNeil Construction failed to exercise reasonable care

in the manner in which it excavated the area adjacent to the Mall
by, among other things, removing almost all the soil adjacent to
the south wall, failing to shore up and brace the south wall,
diverting Mill Creek directly against the Mall's south wall, and
by inadequately replacing the soil adjacent to the south wall.
47.

McNeil Construction's negligence caused damage to the

Mall and to Farmers.

12
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48.

McNeil Construction is liable in damages to Farmers for

its negligence,
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Trespass - McNeil Construction)
49.

This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through

42 above as though fully set forth herein.
50.

Pursuant to the construction contract between Bountiful

City and McNeil Construction, McNeil Construction trespassed on
Farmer's

Mall

by

entering

thereon,

removing

Farmer's

soil,

failing to shore up and brace the south wall of the mall during
construction, diverting water from Mill Creek directly against
the Mall's south wall, and inadequately replacing the original
soil,

and

otherwise

abusing,

unreasonably

exercising,

and

exceeding the rights available to it under the easements in favor
of Bountiful City.
51.

These trespasses caused damage to and seriously injured

Farmers and its Mall.
52.

McNeil Construction is liable to Farmers for damages

caused by these trespasses.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Contract - McNeil Construction)
53.

This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through

42 as though fully set forth herein.
13
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54.

The

Bountiful

construction

City

and

contract

McNeil

for

the

Construction

Culvert

between

required

McNeil

Construction to shore up, brace, underpin, sheet, and protect as
may be necessary all foundations and other parts of all existing
structures

adjacent to and

adjoining

the site of the

Culvert

construction project.
55.

This contract further required McNeil Construction to

provide, install, and maintain adequate sheeting and bracing to
support the sides of banks of excavation.
56.
divert

This contract further required McNeil Construction to
Mill

Creek

so

as

to

avoid

is a third

party

damage

to

the

adjoining

property.
57.

Farmers

beneficiary

of the above-

described contract.
58.

McNeil

Construction

Bountiful City and with Farmers
the

contract

shoring,

by

failing

bracing,

and

to

breached

its

contract

with

as a third party beneficiary of
provide

underpinning

necessary
as

and

required

adequate
for

the

foundation, walls, floors, and ceilings for Farmers1 building.
59.

McNeil Construction is liable to Farmers for damages

caused by McNeil Construction's breach of the contract.

14
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Inverse Condemnation - Diversion of Mill Creek)
60.

This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through

42 as though fully set forth herein.
61.
McNeil

By virtue of the contract between Bountiful City and
Construction,

Bountiful

City

retained

the

right

and

authority to control the method, means, and manner that McNeil
Construction would perform the details of the contract, including
the method, means, and manner of diverting Mill Creek

during

construction.
62.

During

the

construction

of

the

Culvert

project,

Bountiful City did in fact exercise control over, and was aware
of and approved of, how McNeil Construction diverted Mill Creek
against the south wall of the Mall.
63.

By virtue of the control

retained

and exercised by

Bountiful City over McNeil Construction's diversion of Mill Creek
against

the

south

wall

and

by

virtue

of

Bountiful

City ? s

awareness of and approval of that diversion, Bountiful City is
liable for the diversion and its effects.
64.
diverted

As previously alleged, the water that Bountiful City
from Mill

Creek

against the south wall of the Mall

seeped through the spaces between the wall's concrete panels,
causing

a "hydro compacting" of the fill material
15
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south wall and underneath the Mall floor.

As also previously

alleged, this hydro compacting caused permanent damage to the
Mall.
65.
resulting

Bountiful
seepage

City's
and

diversion

hydro

of

compaction

Mill

Creek

constitute

and
an

the

actual

physical invasion of the Mall by a superinduced addition of water
from

Mill

Creek

superinduced

against

addition

the
of

south wall

water

of

the Mall.

effectually

This

impaired

the

usefulness of the Mall and substantially impaired and reduced the
value of the Mall by virtue of the permanent damage it caused to
the Mall.
and

Such impairment of usefulness and value was a natural

foreseeable

consequence

of

the

superinduced

addition

of

water.
66.

Bountiful City's impairment of the usefulness and value

of the Mall constitutes a taking of private property for public
use within the scope of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
67.

Farmers is entitled and requests just compensation for

this taking and its attendant reduction of the value of the Mall.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Inverse Condemnation - Unreasonable Removal of Lateral Support)
68.

This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through

42 as though fully set forth herein.
16
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69.
McNeil

By virtue of the contract between Bountiful City and
Construction,

Bountiful

City

retained

the

right

and

authority to control the method, means, and manner that McNeil
Construction

would

perform

the

details

of

that

contract,

including the method, means, and manner of removing and replacing
soil adjacent to nearby foundations, walls and structures, and of
shoring and bracing adjacent foundations, walls and structures.
70.

During

the

construction

of

the

Culvert

project,

Bountiful City did in fact exercise control over, and was aware
of and approved of, how McNeil Construction removed and replaced
the soil adjacent to the south wall, and how McNeil shored and
braced the south wall.
71.

By virtue of the control

retained

and exercised by

Bountiful City over McNeil Construction's acts, and by virtue of
Bountiful City's awareness and approval of those acts, Bountiful
City is liable for McNeil Construction's acts and the effects of
those acts in removing the original soil adjacent to the south
wall of the Mall, in failing to shore and brace the south wall,
in first failing to replace the original soil adjacent to the
south wall, and in eventually replacing the original soil with an
insufficient

amount

of backfill, of poor

significant density or compaction.
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72.

As an owner of land adjacent to Mill Creek, Farmers has

a legal right to reasonable

lateral support of its land.

Such

right to lateral support is an interest in land.
73.

In constructing

the Culvert

project, Bountiful

City

unreasonably removed the lateral support from the south wall of
Farmer's Mall.

This removal of lateral support caused permanent

damage to the Mall so as to interfere with Farmers' use of the
Mall and substantially impair and reduce the value of the Mall.
74.
caused

The impairment of the usefulness and value of the Mall
by

Bountiful

City's

unreasonable

removal

of

lateral

support to the Mall constitutes a taking of private property for
public use within the scope of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
75.

Farmers is entitled to and requests just compensation

for this taking and its attendant reduction of the value of the
Mall.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Inverse Condemnation - Foreseeable and Natural Consequences)
76.

This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through

42, 61 through 63, and 69 through 71, as though fully set forth
herein.
77.

Prior

to

undertaking

18
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Bountiful City knew that a necessary part of construction would
be the diversion of Mill Creek during the construction.
78.

The

foreseeable

and

natural

consequences

of

the

diversion of Mill Creek included the following:
A.

That

water

from

Mill

Creek

would

be

diverted

against the south wall of the Mall;
B.

That such a diversion would require the removal of

the soil laterally supporting the south wall;
C.

That the removal of such lateral

support would

probably cause permanent damage to the Mall, thus impairing and
reducing the value of the Mall;
D.

That the diverted

Mill

Creek

water would

seep

through the south wall; and
E.

That such seepage would also probably impair or

reduce the value of the Mall by causing permanent damage to the
Mall.
79.

Bountiful City intentionally and deliberately proceeded

with the Culvert project and its necessary creek diversion, with
full

awareness

of

the

natural,

consequences of such diversion.

foreseeable,

and

probable

By so proceeding, Bountiful City

assumed the risks of such consequences, including damage to the
Mall.
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80.

The direct and immediate

foreseeable

result of such natural and

consequences, without regard to the negligence

non-negligence

of McNeil

Construction, was

interference

or

with

Farmers1 use of the Mall and substantial reduction and impairment
of the value of that the Mall.
81.

Such impairment of the usefullness

and value of the

Mall, being a natural and foreseeable consequence of Bountiful
City's intentional and deliberate acts, is a taking within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
82.

Farmers is entitled to and requests just compensation

for this taking.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Inverse Condemnation - Fault of Bountiful City)
83.

This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through

42 as though fully set forth herein, and such other paragraphs as
are referred to herein.
84.

Bountiful City is at fault in causing and allowing the

diversion of Mill Creek against the south wall and in causing and
allowing the unreasonable removal of the lateral support to the
south

wall,

as

previously

alleged,

for one

or more

of

the

following reasons:
A.

Inherent in the construction of the Culvert was a

risk of physical harm to Farmers unless special precautions were
20
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taken.

Such precautions included proper diversion of Mill Creek

so as to not damage the Mall and shoring and bracing of the south
wall of the Mall.

Bountiful City had a non-delegable duty to

oversee the project and ensure that such precautions were taken.
Bountiful City failed to do this, and therefore is liable for
McNeil

Construction's

failure

to

take

such

precautions,

as

previously alleged.
B.

Bountiful

City planned

the construction of the

project in a manner such that, to the extent McNeil Construction
followed those plans, harm would result to the Mall.

Because of

this faulty planning by Bountiful City, Bountiful City is liable
for damages caused to the Mall, as previously alleged.
C.

Bountiful City had a non-delegable duty to insure

that the lateral support to the south wall was not unreasonably
withdrawn.

Therefore,

Construction's

Bountiful

unreasonable

City

is

liable

withdrawal

of

that

for

McNeil

support,

as

previously alleged.
D.

During the construction of the Culvert, Bountiful

City became aware that McNeil Construction had acted unlawfully
and tortiously by unreasonably removing lateral support to the
south wall, failing to provide bracing and shoring to the wall,
diverting

water

from Mill

Creek next to the south wall, and

failing to adequately replace the original soil adjacent to the
21
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wall.

When Bountiful City became aware of such unlawful

and

tortious acts, it had the duty to prevent or remedy that conduct.
Bountiful

City

failed

to

do

so, and

in

fact

inspected

and

accepted the conduct, and therefore is liable for the conduct.
E.

McNeil

Construction

was the

agent of

Bountiful

City, as previously alleged in paragraphs 61 through 63 and 71
through

73.

Therefore,

Bountiful

City

is

liable

for

the

negligent acts of McNeil Construction, as previously alleged.
85.

Because of the fault of Bountiful City, the Mall was

permanently damaged, thereby causing a substantial reduction and
impairment of its value, as previously alleged.
86.

Such reduction and impairment of value is a taking of

private property for public use within the scope of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
87.

Farmers is entitled to and requests just compensation

for this taking

and

its attendant reduction of the value of

Farmer's real estate.
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligent Construction - Interwest Construction
and John Does 1 through 5)
88.

This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through

42 as though fully set forth herein.
89.

Interwest Construction

originally constructed the Mall.
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NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Contract - Interwest Construction)
95*

This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through

42 as thoucjh fully set forth herein,
96.

Upon information and belief, the contract between the

Developers

and

Interwest

Construction

Construction to construct the building

required

Interwest

in accordance with the

Plans.
97.

farmers

is

a

third

party

beneficiary

of

that

construction contract.
98.

Interwest Construction breached its contract with the

developers and Farmers as a third party beneficiary by failing to
perform those duties more particularly described in paragraph 19
herein.
99.

Accordingly,

Interwest

Construction

is

liable

in

damages to Farmers for breach of that contract.
TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligence - Sharp, Sorensen & Associates)
100. This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through
42 as though fully set forth herein.
101. Sharp,

Sorensen

& Associates

designed

the Mall

and

prepared the Plans used by Interwest Construction, the general
contractor, who originally built the Mall.
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108. On

information

and belief, Farmers

alleges that the

original purchaser of the Mall was a business entity known as the
Fashion Village

Shopping

Center in which Merrill

W. Beck

and

William Compton were general partners.
109. On information an belief, Farmers alleges that Merrill
W. Beck and William Compton were the persons who developed and
sold the Mall to the Fashion Village Shopping Center.
110. On information and belief, Farmers alleges that at the
time Beck and Compton sold the Mall to the original purchaser,
the Mall contained hidden and latent defects that the original
purchaser could not have discovered by a reasonable inspection at
the time of sale.

These defects included, among other things, an

improper joining of the south wall to the floor and an improper
placement of backfill inside the building.
111. The defects manifested themselves during the course of
construction of the Culvert.
112. Upon information and belief, the original purchaser was
unaware of the above-described defects at the time of the sale.
113. The above-described defects are so serious and affect
such

an

integral

part

of

the

Mall

as

to

render

the

Mall

uninhabitable by the business entities that occupy the Mall and
unfit for its intended use as a commercial structure.
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120. The above-described defects and breach of implied and
express warranties have damaged Farmers.
121. M e r r i l l

W.

Beck,

William

Compton,

Interwest

Construction, Fashion Village Shopping Center, and The Fashion
Village Group are liable in damages to Farmers for those defects.
PRAYER
Plaintiff prays for the following relief:
1.
all

For judgment in an amount not yet determined against

Defendants

for

all

damage

caused

by

these

Defendants,

including compensatory and consequential damages.
2.

For just compensation for the takings made by Bountiful

3.

For

City.
all

reasonable

costs

in bringing

this

action,

including costs of court and reasonable attorney's fees.
4.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems

just and proper.
DATED this

^3

aay

Qf

S*fl f?rv\ W V~

, 1988.

CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN

James L. tbfristensen
Paul D, Newton
Mark J. Morrise
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Robert F. Babcock
Attorney for Interwes* Consirucl ion
254 West 400 South, Suite 200
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Keith i I rteaae
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
Attorney for Sharp, Sorensei i S P ssoci ates
525 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah h410z.
W. Durre11 Nie1sen
NIELSEN & DIXON, P.C
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Wil.
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Stanley J. Preston
SHOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorney for Bountiful City
P. 0. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

Farmers.cmp
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ALLAN L. LARSON
STANLEY J. PRESTON
ROBERT C. KELLER
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Bountiful Ci 1: y
10 Exchange P l a c e , Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 ,
Telephone: < 8": . 521-90'/-'.
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IN T H E SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 'T)URT OF DAVIS COUNTY

FARMERS N E W WORLD LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plain Li t I.
v.
BOUNTIFUL CITY, McNEIL
CONSTRUCTION, SHARP SORENSEN
AND A S S O C I A T E S , INTERWEST
CONSTRUCTION, FASHION V I L L A G E
SHOPPING CENTER,, a partnership
THE FASHION V I L L A G E GROUP,
MERRILL W . BECK, WILLIAM
COMPTON, and JOHN DOES 1
through 5,

CI vil No

41 340

Defendants.
Defendant
r e c " i.irl
Hoi

t .

Plaintiff

Bount It u1
\*

• ~r
.iic^j

City's

.; 1. S 111 1, S S

HP

'* *

U.JL t^'-JiJihj,

w a s represented

by Jame.i

Bountiful C:*— ,a:. T • r . • • . '
*'.\e CCui ', :,^vM*<-i

Motion

rovidwevj

:

L^e

*,Li '-uvember
:hristensen.

'•
L.J^.-,

< .
Defendant

- <)n.
\J

leadings,

memoranda,

FILMED

OPCOS'J

and affidavits on file, having heard oral argument of counsel,
and being fully advised, has now issued its Ruling dated December
7, 1988, in which it treated defendant Bountiful City's Motion to
Dismiss as a Motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to Rule 12(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

In its Ruling, the Court

concluded as follows:
In its First Amended Complaint, plaintiff alleges various
causes of

action

against

inverse condemnation.

defendant Bountiful

City based

upon

The Court finds that under none of the

facts suggested or set forth in the pleadings of the plaintiff is
there a taking so as to bring the matter within the purview of
the

Fifth

Amendment

to

the

United

States

Constitution

and

therefore grants defendant Bountiful City's Motion,
Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that defendant
Bountiful City's Motion for Summary Judgment is well taken, and,
as a matter of law, should be granted.
WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
FOLLOWS:
October
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17, 1988, is hereby granted

asserted
Complaint

against
are

Bountiful

hereby

City

dismissed

AND DECREED AS

to Dismiss dated

and all causes of

action

in plaintiff's

First Amended

with

and

prejudice

upon

merits, each party to bear its own costs and attorneys' fees.
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PAUL D. NEWTON
MARK J. MORRISE
Attorneys for Plaintiff Farmers
New World Life Insurance Companv
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COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
Ji: , ;;. 5RGWN, being duly sworn, says than she is employed
in the law offices of Snow, Christiansen & Martineau, attorneys
f o r

D e f e n d a n t Bountiful. City

h e r e i n ; rnac she served the attached"
___
S u m m a r y Judcfment
i
(Case Mo.
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JL3.V1 S
•istec oeiow cy placing
an envelooe addressed to:
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A t t o r n e y s for P l a i n t i f f :
J a m e s L. Christensen
Paul D. N e w t o n
Mark J. .Morrise
C O R B R I D G E , BAIRD * C H R I S T E N S E N
215 South. State S t r e e t , Suite 3 00
Salt L a k e City, Utah
84111
A t t o r n e y s for McNeil C o n s t . ;
G r e g o r y J. Sanders
J. Mark Whimpey
KIPP 5c CHRISTIAN, ?.C.
175 E a s t 400 South, S U . L - JJ.J
Salt L a k e City, Utah
84111-2314

Attorneys for Fashion Village Giou,',
W. Durrell N i e l s e n
NIELSEN k DIXCN
: 200 Beneficial L^fe :*-•
i6 South State Street:
Salt Lake C i t y , Utah
i -, 1 .1

A t t o r n e y s for S h a r p , _ S o r e n s e n :
Keith W . M e a d e
C O H N E , RAPPAPORT , .^EHAL
525 E a s t 100 South
S a l t Lake City, Utah
84.102

Attorneys for Merrill W, Beck:
Darvin C. H a n s e n
HANSEN & CRIST
110 West Center Street
Bountiful, Utah
3 4 010

A t t o r n e y s for Interwest:
R o b e r t F. Babock
W A L S T A D & BABCOCK
254 W e s t 400 South, Suite 20 0
S a l t L a k e City, Utah
84101

William W. Ccmpton
9 7 S C r e amerv ?vo a d
Newton, P* ^13940

and causing the same to be mailed
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16th day of D e c e m b e r
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..SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me cai..
Decemb^ 1 19 88.
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